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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to developing countries have risen to an
unprecedented level in the 1990s. Aitken and Harrison (1999) note that in 1997 FDI
represented about 40% of all public and private capital flows to developing countries.
Alongside this increased level of multinational corporation (MNC) engagement in the
developing world, another trend must be noted. The nature of such involvement has also
been transformed. Most significantly, MNCs have increased their usage of alternatives
to wholly owned subsidiaries such as joint equity ventures (JVs) and non-equity inter-
firm contractual arrangements.1 These arm’s length (non-equity) arrangements will be
referred to as technology purchases (TPs).2 Additionally, MNCs have sought important
contributions from local counterparts that have had a significant impact on the ultimate
success of an investment project.3 Finally, it has become evident that policy makers in
less developed countries (LDCs) seek out MNCs in order to gain access to their
intangible assets such as advanced technology or marketing capability rather than the
MNCs’ stock of physical capital. The model of multinationals developed in this
dissertation brings each of these observed tendencies to the forefront. In so doing, this
                                                
1 Oman (1989) argues these alternative forms of investment are the single largest form of MNC
involvement in the developing world since the 1970s. Caves (1996), Rugman (1986) and Beamish and
Banks (1987) all note that few of the alternative forms of contracting and equity arrangements between
MNCs and developing country firms have been viewed through the metric of formal economic modeling.
2 This dissertation follows existing literature and employs a very broad concept of technology purchase.
A TP may include royalty payments, management fees, patent and trademark infringement rights,
copyright fees or any number of other licensing arrangements. Generally, these terms refer an arm’s
length (i.e., no equity involvement) exchange. However, the contracting mechanism employed in this
paper also explains why a MNC may use these mechanisms in conjunction with equity.
3 Beamish and Banks (1987), Miller et al. (1997) and Gomes-Casseres (1989) present evidence of both
the type and importance of local contributions.
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model is able to explain certain phenomena and address key questions that have
previously escaped examination by formal economic theory.
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND CRITIQUE
There are a number of weaknesses with current theoretical explanations of FDI.
Chiefly, as noted in the introduction, MNCs have many available entry-mode options
and current theory offers little insight into this choice. Models of FDI which rely
heavily upon “New Trade Theory” do not address the causes or impact of shared
ownership and assume away the possibility of contractual arrangements. Krugman
(1983) who rules out licensing by assumption believing it to be “relatively unimportant
in practice” is fairly typical.  Even those papers which model MNCs’ choice between
direct ownership and contracting (e.g., Horstmann and Markusen (1987, 1996)) offer no
insights into a MNC’s choice between shared and sole ownership.
A second weakness is that prior models have mis-characterized the knowledge
transfer process. Most models of FDI assume that MNCs possess knowledge-based
assets that can be costlessly or inexpensively transferred to an additional location. Prior
research calls into question this non-rivalry assumption. Teece (1976) finds that it “is
quite inappropriate to regard existing technology as something that can be made
available at zero social cost.” Indeed, the author finds that transfers within the same
company are quite costly. Contractor (1985) echoes this point.
Several explanations have been offered for the costly nature of such transfers.
For example, knowledge may be embodied in the individuals who employ the expertise.
Contractor (1985, p. 19) argues that “technology transfer is not the transfer of only
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codified information in patents, blueprints, manuals and so on. Rather it is the transfer
of a production or distribution capability that may also require interpersonal contact of a
long duration.” Thus, technology transferred by MNCs may closely resemble North’s
(1990) concept of tacit knowledge. However, even though some research has analyzed
the impact of costly transfer (e.g., Wang and Blomstrom (1992)), there has been little
analysis as to the reason for the costliness. In particular, there has been little or no
formal analysis of the market failures that make such transfers costly.4 This observation
that knowledge transfer may be costly is particular damaging to models in which MNCs
choose equity over arm’s length transfer because they fear disclosure of proprietary
information to third parties. Finally, given Mansfield and Romeo’s (1980) finding that
as a rule technological secrets are not revealed more rapidly under licensing than they
would be with trade or other entry modes, only one reliable conclusion remains. The
fear that proprietary knowledge may become public information may indeed affect the
decision to engage in a particular economy or the type of activity conducted (see Lee
(1996)), but it will not have a strong impact on the decision among trade, licensing and
FDI.
There are also questions regarding the strategic and dynamic implications of
current explanations of entry-mode. Contrary to the prediction of Horstmann and
Markusen (1987), licensing arrangements may act as a stepping stone to future
expansion via FDI. Contractor cites several examples and Giannitsis (1991) concludes
that “licensing was often the preferred instrument for entering the Greek market before
deciding on other forms of investment (subsidiary, share participation, acquisition of
                                                
4 There has been a great deal of discussion of these market failures (see Caves (1996) for a summary) but
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licensee firm).” This sort of behavior could not arise in the context of Horstmann and
Markusen’s model. The authors note that “were the home-country only to license for a
finite number of periods, the licensee would always have the incentive to dissipate [the
value of the license] before [it] was revoked.” In a later paper, Horstmann and
Markusen (1996) acknowledge this weakness and simply assume that MNCs can write
short-term contracts. Additionally, Fikkert (1994) and Giannitsis (1991) find that equity
investment and other forms of technology purchase are complementary activities. In all
current models, equity investment is a substitute for licensing which arises when
transaction costs to third parties are prohibitively high.
Finally, many explanations of FDI only explain import substituting investment
and are frequently tied to retailing and distribution networks. While some foreign
investors seek to capture market share in the host country, others target export markets
or involve both production and distribution activities. While no claim is made that the
model developed in this dissertation is a general model of all multinational activities,
the problems of moral hazard and hidden action are relevant to both import substituting
and export-oriented activities as well as production and distribution.
1.3 SUMMARY OF MODEL AND RESULTS
The model developed here relies upon bi-lateral moral hazard. The essence of
this approach is that collaboration between MNCs and local partners is best modeled as
an interaction between two input providers, each subject to an incentive constraint. The
market failures arise because the actual amount of these inputs provided by a particular
                                                                                                                                              
relatively little formal modeling. Horstmann and Markusen (1996, 1987) are two exceptions.
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party is not observable by any other party. Equity ownership provides a claim to profits
and thereby generates the incentive to contribute such unobservable inputs. Because
shared ownership is necessary for each partner to provide an unobservable input, this
model demonstrates a motivation for JVs; a frequently relied upon contracting
mechanism heretofore ignored. However, moral hazard alone is not capable of
explaining the choice among the rich array of possible entry modes: wholly owned
subsidiaries (WOSs), equity joint ventures and arm’s length exchange of proprietary
assets.5
MNCs obviously choose the entry mode that generates the greatest profits. To
explain the choice among these alternatives, the model developed here allows
differential abilities in each of the unobservable resources. The two unobservable inputs
are managerial ability required to transfer and adapt technology, and managerial
supervision of local supply networks and regulatory requirements. MNC management is
more proficient at the former of these tasks and local managers at the latter. JVs arise
when production technology dictates that each unobservable resource is vital to the
production process and each partner is particularly skilled at its respective managerial
tasks. If the intangible contributions of the local firm are relatively unimportant or
capably performed by the MNC, the MNC has no incentive to share equity and will
open a wholly owned subsidiary. Similar logic indicates when a MNC will maximize its
profits through non-equity involvement with an LDC partner. The equilibrium entry
mode emerges from the optimizing behavior of the MNC and local counterpart and
                                                
5 As noted in Footnote 2, our contracting mechanism allows MNCs to employ management fees,
licensing payments and such in joint equity operations. Because of this and our definitions of the
components of the optimal contract, this three-way division fully categorizes all forms of MNC
involvement with LDC collaborators.
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ultimately hinges on the exogenous production technology and idiosyncratic managerial
skills.6
This approach draws a direct connection between the intangible assets LDCs
seek out and the unobservable resources MNCs provide. Therefore, a key advantage of
this model is that it enables the investigation of the impact of public policy on a MNC’s
contribution of intangible assets and its choice of entry mode. Particular attention is
paid to technology transfer since this is perhaps the most important, if not sole reason
LDCs seek out FDI. Not surprisingly given this rather unique approach, very different
conclusions regarding policy towards MNCs are reached. In fact, it is shown here that
policies others have proposed to mitigate distortions created by multinationals actually
reduce the incentive of foreign firms to contribute intangible assets. A very important
implication of this model is policies such as sales taxes, export promotion programs and
local content policies all decrease MNCs’ incentive to establish joint ventures and to
transfer technology regardless of entry mode.
This dissertation represents a significant improvement over prior research in a
number of areas. First, by modeling an explicit class of market failures rather than
simply asserting their existence, this paper explains a MNC’s choice over a wider array
of possible entry modes. Second, the model deals directly with the issue of public
policy and the intangible benefits of FDI. Third, unlike prior explanations of entry
mode, this model is consistent with costly technology transfer. Fourth, although static,
this model provides a reasonable interpretation for the commonly observed behavior of
initial MNC entry in an arm’s length fashion followed by subsequent entry via
                                                
6 Similar models have been employed to study sharecropping in agriculture (Eswaran and Kotwal (1985))
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ownership. Namely, the MNC’s acquisition of skills relevant to the local economy has
decreased the MNC’s incentive to share rents with a partner. Finally, because problems
of hidden action are relevant to a wide variety of activities, this model of FDI is much
more widely applicable than prior models.
A key focus of the theoretical portion of this dissertation is on the determination
of MNC entry mode and equity share. As scarce as the theoretical work has been in this
area, empirical work is even more rare. While there has been a substantial amount of
interest in the determinants of the share of industry output produced by foreign owned
firms in developing countries, this author is unaware of any prior empirical study which
has analyzed the determinants of the foreign equity stake at the firm or plant level.
Perhaps due to this lack of investigation, there is a presumption that the same forces are
at work at the micro and macro level.
 When confronted with data on foreign entries into the Indonesian manufacturing
sector, this theory holds up quite well. The results indicate that contrary to perceived
wisdom, there are important differences between the determinants of the share of an
industry’s output produced by foreign owned firms and foreign ownership at the plant-
level. At the plant-level, ownership is used as an incentive mechanism and is
unresponsive to factors such as industry concentration and scale economies that are
important indicators of aggregate foreign presence. Additionally, risk does not have a
significant impact on ownership share and certainly does not have the impact presumed
throughout the literature.
                                                                                                                                              
and franchising in the modern retail sector (Bhattacharyya and LaFontaine (1995) and Romano (1994)).
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Chapter 2 of this dissertation presents the theoretical model and derives basic
theoretical implications. Chapter 3 examines the impact of public policy on MNC entry
mode and technology transfer. Chapter 4 compares aggregate determinants of foreign
ownership share to plant level determinants using a simplified version of the theoretical
model developed in the first half of the dissertation. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes and
presents policy implications.
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CHAPTER 2: MODEL AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The model developed in this chapter endogenizes a MNC’s choice among
various entry modes: wholly owned subsidiary (WOS), joint equity venture (JV) or
technology purchase agreement (TP). This is accomplished by explicitly modeling the
market failures likely to arise in inter-firm collaboration. The market failures in this
model are caused by hidden action in the transfer of advanced MNC technology and
managerial activities tied directly to the local economy.7 It is costly to monitor these
activities and therefore they are not contractible.
This approach is eminently in accord with the discussion of collaborative
ventures appearing in both statistical examinations and case studies. As will be
discussed below, operating in an unfamiliar developing country is an inherent
disadvantage for MNCs who are frequently unfamiliar with both the written laws and
informal practices. Contractor (1985) presents survey results that suggest that the vast
majority of technology purchases involve a transfer of knowledge where effort is
important. Dymsza (1988) cites particular cases when equity shares in JVs changed as
the need for intangible contributions changed.8 Similarly, Ramachandran (1993) finds
that proxies for MNC effort positively co-vary with ownership percentage. Each of
these observations points to moral hazard.
                                                
7 Dymsza (1988) notes the importance of complementary contributions by JV partners. For example,
MNCs are expected to contribute “manufacturing technology, product know-how, patents, business
expertise, and management development,” while the local firm contributes “knowledge of the country
environment and market, and contacts with the government, financial institutions, local suppliers and
labor unions.”
8 For example, as the relative importance of contributions change in the favor of local firms, MNCs often
reduce their equity stake. However, if it becomes evident that increased technology transfer is needed to
achieve a collaboration’s potential, MNCs often switch from a TP to a JV.
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Moral hazard is also consistent with Teece’s (1976) observation that technology
transfer is costly. In this model, the transfer of technological capabilities is costly
because it necessitates the expenditure of scarce managerial effort in addition to the
costless reproduction of blueprints and technical manuals. MNCs’ technological assets
therefore closely resemble North’s (1990) concept of  “tacit knowledge” and not the
excludable but non-rival assets traditionally examined in the literature. Tacit knowledge
is not easily transferred through blueprints, manuals and other readily reproducible
materials because know-how can be “embodied in employees” (Markusen (1991))
through such characteristics as corporate culture (Oman (1989)). Indeed, Arora (1996)
finds that given tacit knowledge, tied sales of inputs can improve the efficiency of arm’s
length technology transfers. The intuition behind this result is the same as that behind
the policy conclusions in Chapter 3.
2.2 THEORETICAL MODEL
In order to account for these characteristics of technology, this model assumes
technical manuals, blueprints and other forms of disembodied technology must be
combined with scarce managerial resources in order to produce effective know-how -
capabilities useful in the production process. Let “B” be the blueprints or other dis-
embodied knowledge and “e” unobservable managerial effort, and define effective
know-how, “K” as
(2.1) K=k(B,e, δ1)
where k(.) is an aggregator function which is increasing and concave in B and e. The
parameter δ1 (0 ≤ δ1 ≤ 1) captures the relative importance of disembodied knowledge
11
and managerial effort. When δ1= 1, effort is redundant. As may be the case with very
simple or older technology, blueprints are sufficient.
When engaging in production in a new country, a MNC must cultivate
relationships with local suppliers. One reason for this is that the quality of inputs is
important. Because quality matters, the amount of usable material inputs, “M,” depends
both on the observable quantity of locally purchased intermediate goods, “L,” and the
amount of managerial resources spent supervising and fostering connections, “c,” with
local suppliers.9 Therefore, the amount of usable materials, “M,” is defined as
(2.2) M=m(L,c, δ2)
where m(.) is a linearly homogeneous10 aggregator function which is increasing and
concave in L and c. The parameter  δ2 (0 ≤ δ2 ≤ 1) captures the relative importance of
observable locally purchased intermediate inputs and “connections” in ensuring the
availability of useable materials. If quality does not matter, δ2 is equal to 1. Let e and c
be measured in the same units.
The production process combines effective know-how, “K,” with useable locally
purchased materials, “M,” and other traditional economic variables. Thus in the
                                                
9 Alternatively, in order to enter a new country, a MNC must obtain approval from a regulatory body.
Obtaining such approval may depend on observable factors such as the possession of certain licenses or
permits and also unobservable connections with the appropriate bureaucrats who will look the other way.
10 Note that the aggregator function for usable locally purchased inputs is assumed to be linear
homogeneous. If a firm needs to double the quantity of usable materials, it is reasonable that they would
need to double the quantity of purchased materials and double the managerial effort spent sorting through
the material. Given the nature of technology this additional restriction would make little sense for the
function k(.).  For example, taking  “B” to be the blueprints for a production facility, in order to increase
the effective know-how derived from these plans - by building a second identical production facility – a
firm need only expend additional managerial resources overseeing construction and need not expend any
further resources on design.
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production function below, “L” is a vector of inputs for which quality matters, “I” is a
vector of inputs such as labor, capital or other materials which can be used without the
expenditure of additional managerial effort.11
(2.3) Y= F(K,M,I) = F(k(B,e;δ1),m(L,c;δ2),I)
Suppressing the parameters, this can be written as
(2.3a) Y=F(L,I,e,c).
Assume:
(a1)   i. F(.) is strictly increasing in L, I, e and c.
 ii. F(.) is concave in L, I, e and c.
iii. F(.) is continuous in L, I, e and c.
iv. F(.) is linearly homogeneous in L, I, e and c.
 v. F(.) is bounded from above.
vi. F(0,0,0,0)=0
(a2) F(L,I,0,c) = F(L,I,e,0) = 0
The properties assumed in (a1) are standard and follow Diewert (1973). 12
Further, note (iv) captures the notion that “B” represents the public good aspect of
knowledge while (a2) simply states that positive amounts of both e and c are required to
produce positive output.
Uncertainty is introduced to ensure that the MNC and local counterpart are not
able to impute values for e and c once profits have been realized. If firms could observe
e and c in this fashion, they would be able to write contracts based on these ex-post
realizations. The random variable, Θ, which has a mean of 1 is assumed to be, as in
other models of this nature, unobservable. In this instance, Θ may be thought of as the
                                                
11 Such factors might be homogeneous or purchased on international markets where quality is assured.
12 Diewert assumes only that the production function is non-decreasing in its arguments.
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effect of political uncertainty.13 For simplicity, we assume the firm is a price taker with
the price equal to 1. Profits are equal to
(2.4) Θ [F(L,I,e,c) – w’ L – p’ I]
As in Steven’s (1994) and Biswas’s (1998) models of FDI, political uncertainty impacts
both revenues and variable costs.14 However, in this model, the political/bureaucratic
process extracts an uncertain tax rather than causes a shutdown.15 In LDCs, both
policies and the application of them may involve a random component if bureaucrats
either lack certain skills or are corrupt. Given the limited purpose of uncertainty in bi-
lateral moral hazard models, this seems to be a reasonable characterization.
This model departs from models presented in the retailing literature in that the
MNC need not engage in joint production.16 Either a MNC or the local firm may go it
alone through a WOS or TP respectively. In addition to the patent or basic skill, B,
possessed by the MNC, this model proposes that each partner possesses an additional
type of firm specific asset or skill. Resources spent by a MNC fostering connections
with local suppliers are a fraction as effective as local firm resources, therefore c=γmcm
(0 ≤ γm ≤ 1) if the MNC were to open a wholly-owned subsidiary and provide the non-
marketable input c. If managerial effort spent fostering connections by the local firm, cl
                                                
13 This paper assumes uncertainty in the local environment prevents the actual amount of managerial
inputs from being observed but does not alter any other input choices. This approach is taken by Eswaran
and Kotwal (1985) and Bhattacharyya and LaFontaine (1995). Because Romano directly assumes the
amount of managerial inputs cannot be observed, he does not introduce uncertainty.
14 Political/bureaucratic uncertainty affects only revenues in Wei (1997) and thus distorts input choices.
In the present context, the only role of the unobservable random variable is to ensure that efforts may not
be imputed from observed profits. As in all bi-lateral moral hazard models, we are not interested in the
impact of uncertainty per se.
15 Batra (1986) suggests that a Pigouvian tax on the profits of a MNC may be necessary to offset
distortions introduced by MNCs. As demonstrated by Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995), we could
also have modeled this as a random lump-sum tax rather than a random tax rate.
16 In this sense, the model is similar to Eswaran and Kotwal (1985).
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and cm are measured in the same units, γmcm, gives efficiency units of managerial effort.
Likewise the MNC has an advantage in transferring knowledge. Hence, e=γlel (0 ≤ γl ≤
1) if the input e is provided by the local firm after a technology purchase.17 Again, el
and em are measured in the same units and γlel measures local firm managerial effort
devoted to technology transfer in efficiency units.
Since L and I can be purchased in the market, they will always be chosen to
equal their first best values regardless of ownership structure. Risk neutral firms will
seek to maximize expected profits. Therefore,
(2.5) Max L,I E{Θ [F(L,I,e,c) – w’ L – p’ I]} ≡ Max L,I F(L,I,e,c) – w’ L – p’ I
Define the restricted profit function,
(2.5a) π (e,c) = Max L,I F(L,I,e,c) – w’ L – p’ I
which Diewert (1973) theorem (2.20) demonstrates has the following properties
(p1) linearly homogeneous in e and c
(p2) concave and continuous in e and c
(p3) strictly increasing in e,c18
(p4) bounded from above
No assumptions are made regarding the complementarity or substitutability of e and c.
(a3) πec>0, πec<0 or πec=0
                                                
17 In a WOS, a MNC is the residual claimant and therefore the MNC must provide all non-contractable
goods. Under a TP, the local firm is the residual claimant and the MNC has no incentive to provide e.
18 Diewert (1973) proved that the restricted profit function is non-decreasing in e and c.
Because the production function is assumed to be strictly increasing in e and c, the
restricted profit function can easily be shown to be strictly increasing in e and c. Let L0,
I0 be the solution to MAX{L,I} F(L,I,e0,c0) – w’ L – p’ I and let L1, I1 be the solution to
MAX{L,I} F(L,I,e1,c0) – w’ L – p’ I with e0<e1. Then we have the following:
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The cost of providing managerial resources for the MNC, R(e), and for the local firm,
S(c), are assumed to have the following standard properties:
(a4) R(0)=R’(0)=S(0)=S’(0)=0
(a5) R’(x), S’(x) > 0 for all x>0, R’’≥0,  S’’ ≥ 0
This fully characterizes the production process, all that remains of the MNC’s
problem is the division of collaboration’s profits between it and its local partner. The
model assumes a linear sharing rule as it has a number of nice features. First, such a
sharing rule is characterized by two constants, α and β, the optimal value of which is
endogenously chosen by the MNC. The MNC and local firm share of profits are defined
in (6a) and (6b) respectively.
(2.6a) α + β π(e,c)
(2.6b) -α +[1-β] π(e,c)
Each constant has a very simple interpretation in the present context. The lump sum
portion of the contract, α, corresponds to technology payments, and the slope
parameter, β, corresponds to the MNC’s ownership share. Most importantly, as is
shown in Appendix B, the same incentives can be achieved with this relatively simple
sharing arrangement as can be achieved with a more complicated non-linear sharing
rule.
The model also assumes that in a JV, e and c are determined in accordance with
a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium with each party performing its most proficient
managerial task and
                                                                                                                                              
F(L0,I0,e0,c0) – w’ L0 – p’ I0 < F(L0,I0,e1,c0) – w’ L0 – p’ I0 ≤ F(L1,I1,e1,c0) – w’ L1 – p’
I1. The proof that the restricted profit function is increasing in c is identical.
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(a6) the Nash equilibrium is unique.19
Competition among local firms ensures that all rents remain with the MNC. The optimal
JV contracting problem for the MNC is ...
(2.7) Π*M,JV = Max { α,β e,c}α + β π(e,c)-R(e)
subject to
(2.7a) β πe(e,c) = R’(e)
(2.7b) [1-β] πc(e,c) = S’(c)
(2.7c) [1- β] π(e,c) - α - S(c) ≥ 0
where (2.7a), (2.7b) and (2.7c) are the MNC’s incentive constraint, the local firm’s
incentive constraint and the local firm’s participation constraint.
Problem (2.7) defines the maximum profits that a MNC can earn under a JV. In
order to determine entry mode, this value must be compared to a WOS and a TP. Profits
for the WOS, the local firm’s profits under a TP, and the MNC’s profits under a TP are
defined in (2.8), (2.9) and (2.10) respectively.
(2.8) Π*M,WOS (γm)  = Max {e,c} π(e,γmc) -R(e+c)
(2.9) Π*L,TP (γl)       = Max {e,c} π(γl e, c) -S(e+c) - α
(2.10) Π*M,TP (γl)    = Max {0, Π*L,TP(γl)}
2.3 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
The model produces a number of interesting theoretical results regarding joint
equity ventures, the only entry mode yet to be analyzed by theoretical economists. In
                                                
19 The assumptions above are sufficient for existence and the following condition is sufficient for
uniqueness πec ≤ πcc  , πee . A proof is provided in Appendix A.
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order to simplify the analysis, we write the JV contracting problem as a Lagrangean.20,
21
(2.11) Π*M,JV = Max {α,β,e,c}  α +  β  [π (e,c)] -R(e) +  λ [β πe (e,c) - R’(e) ]
+ µ [ [1-β] πc (e,c) - S’(c)] + η [ [1- β] π (e,c)  - α - S(c)]
Proposition 1: With two missing markets, ownership must be shared if each party is
expected to contribute managerial effort.
Proof: From the participation constraint we can see that π (e,c) must be positive. If this
were not the case then α would be negative and the MNC would earn negative profits
from the JV.  Given that π (e,c)  is positive, by our earlier assumption both e and c must
also be positive. If  β = 1, we can derive a contradiction from the local firms incentive
constraint, because with β = 1 this constraint can only be satisfied for c=0. Similarly,
we can derive a contradiction with β = 0.
This represents a key advantage of employing bi-lateral moral hazard to model
collaboration between MNCs and local firms. Not only does the approach make
intuitive sense, it also explains the use of joint equity ventures, a frequently employed
entry mode ignored in prior examinations of the subject.
Proposition 2: Joint equity ventures arise when neither collaborator is proficient at both
managerial tasks.
Proof: A MNC will enter via a JV when Π*M,JV≥ Π*M,WOS(γm) and Π*M,JV≥ Π*M,TP(γl).
The envelope theorem and (p3) ensure that Π*M,WOS(γm) and Π*M,TP(γl) are strictly
increasing in γm and γl respectively. Therefore, because π is continuous, there exists a
critical pair (γm*, γl*), such that for all (γm, γl) ≤ (γm*, γl*) the MNC will enter via a JV.
                                                
20 The problem is solved in a more complete manner in Appendix C.
21 Rather than employing a Lagrangean, the participation constraint could be solved for α as a function of
β, and the incentive constraints could be simultaneously solved for c(β) and e(β). The problem could then
be set up as an unconstrained maximization problem with β as the only remaining choice variable. This is
the approach taken by Eswaran and Kotwal (1985).
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A multinational will choose to enter via joint equity ventures when it lacks the
skills necessary to navigate the local economy and the local firm lacks the skills needed
to implement the MNC’s technology. JVs are formed when each partner needs the
other. Similar propositions can be proven describing the conditions under which MNCs
will form a wholly owned subsidiary and license technology. Figure 2.1 solves the
model for
Figure 2.1: Contract Outcomes and Skill Parameters
 the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant marginal cost of
providing unobservable inputs.22 When both parties are inefficient at performing their
counterpart’s task, a MNC forms a JV, but as the skill of the MNC (local firm) rises, all
else fixed, the MNC is more likely to enter via a WOS (TP).
                                                
22 Eswaran and Kotwal produce a similar figure.
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Frequently for nationalistic reasons, developing countries have sought ways of
gaining access to advanced MNC technology while minimizing the number of firms
with foreign equity. While Section V will discuss the impact of several of these
policies, note that Figure 2.1 suggests a simple alternative to the heavy-handed policies
frequently adopted. Namely, by improving the scientific and technical capabilities of
local firms, the government can increase the likelihood that local firms are sufficiently
skilled and MNCs choose to enter in an arm’s length fashion.
Proposition 3: The marginal social benefit of technology transfer is greater than the
marginal social cost in all joint equity ventures.
Proof: This follows immediately from the MNC’s incentive constraint and the fact that
the ownership share is between zero and one.
This proposition points to the fundamental problem created by bi-lateral moral
hazard.23 Since the linear contract studied here produces the exact incentives as a more
general non-linear contract, this difficulty is even more problematic. To a developing
country, the marginal social value of MNC effort devoted to technology transfer is at
least equal to the marginal impact of effort on profits.24 The need to share profits has
driven a wedge between this and the MNC’s marginal cost of effort, condemning LDCs
to realize insufficient benefit from technology transfer from MNCs. This model shows
that while MNCs recognize this, they cannot credibly offer to devote more effort to the
transfer of technology. This proposition also demonstrates precisely why it is so
important to distinguish JVs from WOSs. The incentive structure is very different in
                                                
23 Notice, there is an identical problem regarding local firm managerial effort as well.
24 The marginal social value will be greater than this value if there are technology spillovers.
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these two modes of operation and without considering this fact, policy will likely be
misguided.
Proposition 4: Ownership share is simultaneously determined with all other choice
variables.
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Where (2.12) is evaluated at the optimal values of e, c, L and I.
While this expression and the incentive compatibility constraints can in
principle be solved, no intuitive results can be derived without imposing more structure
on the problem.25 However the result is still of significance. First, this model warns that
the frequent econometric practice of including foreign ownership share as an
independent variable creates bias in the parameter estimates. Second, there are few
theoretical or empirical assessments of the determinants of foreign equity share at the
microeconomic level. Aswicahyono and Hill (1995) note this lack of empirical
investigation.
This model, however, precisely derives an expression for the foreign ownership
share and develops testable implications. For example, in related work Bhattacharyya
and LaFontaine (1995) show that under fairly general specifications the optimal
ownership share is determined by parameters of the production function and the cost of
effort functions, and is independent of demand conditions. Aswicahyono and Hill
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(1995) claim that the determinants of industry foreign share and firm level ownership
share are one and the same. In contrast to this, with constant returns to scale technology,
the model in this dissertation shows that that there is little reason to expect barriers to
entry and scale economies, which are important determinants of the foreign share of
industries, to impact the foreign equity share of particular enterprises.26
2.4 DETERMINANTS OF CRITICAL SKILL LEVELS AND ENTRY-MODE
Figure 2.1 demonstrates that MNCs choose entry mode by comparing the two
collaborators’ actual skill levels to certain critical levels. This section relates the
predictions of the model in this regard to existing empirical findings. Characteristics of
the production technology have a very important influence on the determination of the
critical skill levels, (γm*, γl*). To derive concrete results, a Cobb-Douglas technology is
assumed.27 Therefore,
(2.13) Y=[Bδ1e[1-δ1]]α1[Lδ2c[1-δ2]] α2 [I]α3
Figure 2.2 varies α2/α1. In essence, this asks how the critical skill levels vary as
“technological intensity” changes. High technology industries correspond to low values
of α2/α1; the marginal product of technology is high relative to that of other inputs.
                                                                                                                                              
25 For example, if the MNC’s “technological asset” is based purely on its international marketing
expertise, it can be shown that the foreign ownership share is an increasing function of the export
percentage.
26 We return to these issues in Chapter 4.
27 Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) and Bhattacharyya and LaFontaine (1995) analyze this special case as
well.
22
















Gamma M Gamma L
Because the critical level of γl is high and the critical level of  γm is low as α2/α1 is low,
the model predicts that MNCs are less likely to use arm’s length exchanges in high
technology industries. Caves (1996) and Contractor (1985) report a wealth of results
that indicate TPs are less common in technology intensive industries.
Not only does the importance of technology influence the critical skill levels,
but so does the nature of technology. This issue can be addressed by varying the
parameter δ1 in the sub-production function for effective technology (recall, effective
technology = Bδ1e[1-δ1]). For δ1 near 0, effort is of paramount importance and the non-
rival component of technology is relatively unimportant. Accordingly, Figure 2.3
indicates the critical γm is low which increases the probability of entry via a WOS. With
complex or embodied
technology, a MNC is more likely to open a WOS and less likely to rely upon a TP. The
opposite is the case if effort is redundant. This is consistent with Kogut and Zander’s
(1993) finding that codifiability makes it more likely that a technology will be licensed.
Technological effort is less important when the agreement involves older technologies,
is based purely on patent or copyright infringement or imparts only easily codified
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information. Prior research indicates that TPs are much more likely with these sorts of
technological assets.28
The discussion above relates studies of entry mode to the determinants of the
critical skill levels. The model presented here also draws a connection between
empirical findings and the determination of a particular MNC’s ability to navigate the
local environment. A MNC’s prior experience obviously plays an important role in this
regard. MNCs with substantial experience possess the skills necessary to successfully
manage the complex environment in a developing country. They will therefore be more
likely to choose a WOS or JV rather than a TP. There is a substantial volume of
empirical literature that supports this implication of the model.29
“Cultural distance” also has an impact on the choice of entry mode. Ferrantino
(1993) found that FDI from US firms was greater in English speaking countries.
                                                
28 Contractor (1985), and Oman (1989) and Davidson and McFetridge (1984, 1985) all find this to be
true.
29 Yu (1990), Caves (1996), and Gomes-Casseres (1989) all present evidence of this result.
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Davidson and McFetridge (1985) found that US MNCs preferred direct investment to
licensing when the host country was predominantly Catholic or Protestant. Finally,
Kogut and Singh (1988) found that cultural dissimilarities were likely to lead MNCs to
enter the US by joint venture rather than acquisition. The model presented in this paper
would interpret these results as examples where similarities or differences between the
MNC’s home country and the host country impact the skills of the MNC relative to
local firms. Similarities between home and host countries increase γM and increase the
probability of entry by a WOS. Dissimilarities have the exact opposite effect.
2.5 CONCLUSION
The model presented in this chapter offers one clear advantage over most
existing theoretical work in the area of FDI. It endogenously determines entry mode
allowing for traditional FDI, joint equity ventures, and arm’s length transfers. Also in
contrast to earlier models, this research shows that licensing fees and royalty payments
should be employed in conjunction with joint ventures. MNCs will use these
instruments to ensure that they maintain their share of the rents earned based on their
technological assets while also maintaining their partner’s incentives. Additionally, the
model is consistent with a number of stylized facts regarding both the types of
technology that are likely to be transferred under alternative contract types as well as
the types of MNCs that are likely to engage in different types of contracts. In particular,
experienced MNCs are less likely to need to provide ownership equity to local firms as
an incentive mechanism.
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This model also points to the important role played by local firm skills. If local
firms possess particular skills, MNCs will actually seek them out and willingly form
partnerships. Alternatively, if local firms are sufficiently skilled they will be able to
access MNC technological assets through technology purchase agreements. This should
be of particular interest to those governments that seek to minimize the presence of
foreign owned firms. Finally, although this model assumes that all rents remain with the
MNC, if skilled local firms also have a degree of bargaining power, they will be able to
maintain an increased share of the rents generated by these technological assets.
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CHAPTER 3: PUBLIC POLICY, ENTRY MODE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
3.1 INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
The interaction between public policy and the benefits derived from  FDI by
LDCs has drawn much recent attention. In particular, two seemingly contradictory
questions have been asked in connection with developing economies. First, some
researchers have examined policies that attract and increase the benefit of inward FDI.
Second, economists have analyzed policies that minimize the social cost of FDI in
industries that fall short of the perfectly competitive paradigm. The first branch of
research focuses on the acquisition of advanced technology possessed by MNCs, while
the second is primarily concerned with the imperfection of the markets in which MNCs
operate. Because each line of inquiry ignores the very sort of market failure that leads to
firms becoming multinational in the first place, neither approach is entirely satisfactory
and the conclusions may not be robust.
The first approach has examined both the role of policy in attracting new
multinationals (Wheeler and Mody (1992)) and increasing the benefits from existing
subsidiaries. Wang and Blomstrom (1992) and Kokko and Blomstrom (1995) consider
that technology transfer to developing countries may be a costly process. Therefore,
they suggest policies that focus on education, contract security and competition to either
reduce such transfer costs or increase the benefits MNCs may expect to receive. While
the authors’ conclusions are likely correct, because they do not examine precisely the
market failures which render such transfers costly, the results fail to demonstrate the
subtle yet important unintended consequences of public policy.
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The second strand of literature is built upon the presumption that MNCs are
creatures of market imperfection. That is to say MNCs always and everywhere operate
in imperfectly competitive markets, behind non-optimal tariffs, or in industries with
non-clearing factor markets. Understandably, given this basis, attention has been
focused on minimizing the negative impact of MNCs in such environments. Such
literature prescribes instruments such as local content policies, export promotion
schemes or profit taxation in order to attenuate the social costs created by the
interaction of MNCs with pre-existing distortions.
A frequent theme of the second strand of literature is that although policies such
as local content regulation and export promotion policies may not generally achieve
their stated goals, they may have some use when applied selectively to MNCs. For
example, while Grossman (1981) demonstrates that local content regulation may
actually stifle the domestic intermediate goods industry and hurt the exportable sector,
Lahiri and Ono (1998) argue that local content policies directed at foreign nationals can
generally be used to increase host country welfare by spurring competition and
encouraging the entry of relatively efficient MNCs. In addition, while Herander and
Thomas (1986) show that export promotion policies may fail to improve overall trade
balance, Rodrik (1987) argues that such policies may be beneficial when applied to
foreign owned firms. The author shows that such policies mitigate the social cost of
MNCs that operate behind non-optimal tariffs. Chao and Yu (1996) reach a similar
conclusion. In a surplus labor model, Beladi and Chao (1993) show that the influx
foreign investment can increase unemployment. A profit tax on MNCs can limit this
negative impact. Finally, due to capital market imperfections, Batra (1986) finds that
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the transfer of technology alone (i.e., without any accompanying physical capital)
through MNCs can lower employment and real income in developing countries. He,
too, proposes a profit tax to limit such a negative outcome.
Each of the above policies proposes to limit a possible negative impact of FDI
by controlling the size and quantity of foreign investments. While MNCs may chase a
particular sort of market imperfection, prior analysis ignores the fact that MNCs owe
their very existence to an entirely different set of market failures. Broadly defined these
are market failures in the transfer of technology based assets. Given the presence of
these market failures, such policies may alter not only the number of foreign firms but
also alter the behavior of those that still enter a particular market. A full understanding
of  the impact of these frequently employed policies necessitates an analysis of the
impact these policies have on MNC behavior given the type of market failures modeled
in this dissertation.
3.2  IMPACT OF POLICY ON ENTRY MODE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
A number of factors must be considered in this analysis of government policy.
First, due to moral hazard, the JV equilibrium is not necessarily constrained Pareto
optimal.30 In fact, in the joint venture equilibrium there are two types of externalities.
Neither collaborator considers the marginal impact of e or c on its partner’s share of the
profits - the profit sharing externality. Neither does either partner consider the impact of
its own choice of unobservable resources on its partner’s contribution - the Nash
                                                
30 Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) and Arnott and Stiglitz (1987) demonstrate this principle. As long as
goods subject to moral hazard are sensitive to policy instruments, through cross-price effects for
example, there will be room for policy induced Pareto improvements. Below, it is shown that these
observations apply to this model.
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externality. Second, as is done elsewhere, this model assumes policies are applied
selectively to firms with foreign ownership. Finally, although no attempt is made to
derive optimal policy interventions,31 the insights below have important implications
regarding the conclusions drawn from the existing literature discussed above.
As in other models based on incentive contracts and unobservable factors of
production, any positive or negative impact of public policy on MNCs occurs through
the impact of said policies on the incentive compatibility and participation constraints.
The first key feature to notice about this model is that any policy which eases the
incentive compatibility constraints and raises profits in joint ventures will have an
additional effect. The policy will alter the desired entry mode. Using the notation
developed in Chapter 2, consider the following propositions.
Proposition 5: Policies which increase (decrease) the profitability of JVs increase the
critical level of local skills (γl*) necessary for entry via TP. Further, a policy which
simultaneously increases the profitability of JVs and decreases the profitability of
WOSs will increase the critical level of MNC skills (γm*) necessary for entry via WOS.
Proof  : Let Π*M,JV equal the unrestricted JV profit, then clearly if  Π0M,JV equals the
restricted JV profits (i.e., after the additional policy instrument has been imposed),
Π*M,JV ≤  Π0M,JV. Recall, that Π*M,TP is increasing in γl and the critical γl* is determined
by Π*M,TP =  Π0M,JV. Identical logic can be used to prove the second half of the
proposition. The key is that both increasing JV profitability relative to unrestricted
WOS profits and decreasing WOS profits relative to the unrestricted environment
impact γm in the same fashion.
The essence of this proposition is that when governments get their interventions
right and create Pareto improvements in existing JVs - by acting to increase the
                                                
31 No attempt is made because policies directed at foreign firms can alter both the desired levels of inputs
and the desired entry-mode. Policies which improve the profitability of joint ventures may also cause
MNCs to choose JVs rather than WOSs. This will introduce distortions through second best constraints
where there were none originally. It is impossible to weigh these costs against the gains from improved
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profitability of joint ventures - they also increase the likelihood that future MNC
entrants will choose to enter via a JV. Referring to Figure 2.1, which is included here
for convenience, policies which increase the profitability of JVs and decrease the
profitability of WOSs shift the horizontal line up and the vertical line to the right,
increasing the probability that a MNC enters via a joint venture. To the extent that
encouraging MNCs
Figure 2.1: Contract Outcomes and Skill Parameters
to engage in joint equity operations is an independent goal32, the government will
experience a type of policy spillover benefit.
The remainder of this chapter examines five policy interventions. Following the
example of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1987) and Arnott and Stiglitz (1986), the first
                                                                                                                                              
behavior of existing JVs without introducing specific assumptions regarding the distribution of firms
over the skill variables.
31
intervention involves a quota on an input which is a complement to unobservable inputs
and the second a per-unit subsidy. The final three interventions examined are export
promotion policies, revenue taxation of foreign-owned firms and traditional local
content requirements.33
3.2.1 OBSERVABLE INPUT QUOTAS
In order to see that restrictive policies may actually improve JV profits, consider
the following highly stylized model of a local content restriction. Assume L and I are
locally purchased inputs and imported inputs respectively and suppose that all foreign
owned firms are required to purchase a minimum quantity of (all) local inputs, L - Lmin
≥ 0. Substitute this constraint (assuming it binds) into the production function and re-
write the problem as34
(3.1) Max {β,I,e,c}  F(Lmin,I,e,c)-w Lmin -p I -R(e) - S(c)
+ µ1 [β Fe(Lmin,I,e,c) - R’(e)] + µ2 [[1-β] Fc(Lmin,I,e,c) - S’(c)]
Standard intuition regarding the effect of additional constraints on maximization
problems fails. Differentiating with respect to Lmin and using the Envelope Theorem
gives the marginal impact of increasing the quantity restriction.
(3.2) {FL(Lmin,I,e,c) - w} + {µ1 β FeL(Lmin,I,e,c)} + {µ2 [1-β] FcL(Lmin,I,e,c)}
                                                                                                                                              
32 If management cooperation through joint ventures enhances technology spillovers to local firms,
governments may prefer such policies.
33 The adjective “traditional” is used only to distinguish the frequently employed practice of specifying a
percentage of inputs that must be purchased locally from the rather unusual quota in Policy 1.
34 Notice the random variable is eliminated. This is done so that uncertainty does not create an option
value that the constraint will bind and distort input choices. Alternatively it could have been assumed that
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The first term in {} will be negative given that the constraint is binding, but the signs of
the second and third term are indeterminate in general.35 A sufficient condition for JV
profits to increase is that the quantity forcing of locally purchased goods eases the
incentive compatibility constraints (FeL>0 and FcL >0) and these gains are sufficient to
offset the loss created by using locally purchased goods in such a large quantity that
their marginal value product is less than their marginal cost.36 This insight is
generalized and formalized in the following proposition. Suppose there exists an
observable good L1, on which a quantity restriction may be placed. Equation (3.3) is
total profits from a JV. Totally differentiating this expression gives Equation (3.4).
(3.3) (L ) = F(L ,  L(L ) L(L ) I(L ),e(L ),  c(L ) ) - w  L










                           F R   e
  L




1 1 1 2 1 n 1 1 1 1





























− + − + −













Proposition 6: Quantity restrictions on observable inputs may be used to increase JV
profits unless all unobservable inputs are insensitive to changes in observable inputs or
the impacts are such precisely offset one another. Mathematically, such quantity
restrictions may be used to increase JV profits unless
 












Further, quantity restrictions which raise JV profits necessarily increase the provision of
at least one unobservable good.
                                                                                                                                              
the random term was additively separable, with a mean of zero. This would be the case if the firm
occasionally received kick-backs from or paid bribes to bureaucrats.
35 Note that this derivation also shows that profits of WOSs, which are not subject to incentive
compatibility constraints, will be diminished by this policy.
36 In fact, it is easy to see that the increased provision of an unobservable good is a necessary condition
for a quantity restriction on observable inputs to have a positive impact on JV profits.
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Proof: Evaluating Equation (3.4) at the unconstrained equilibrium, the first term and
each of the terms within the summation operators are equal to zero. Because both
[ ] and [ ]F R F Se e c c− −  are positive (see Proposition 3), as long as unobservable inputs
are sensitive to the policy variable, profits can be increased. Clearly, at least one of e
and c must increase in order to increase profits.
This result is not surprising. Profits can be increased as long as unobservable
inputs are sensitive to the amount of at least one observable input. Except in the
unlikely event where the changes in unobservable goods resulting from the quantity
restriction are opposite in sign and of the appropriate magnitude to cancel each other










 are both positive (negative), it is easy to see that a quantity minimum
(maximum) should be used.
In a WOS, because the MNC takes sole ownership and equates, at the margin,
the benefits and costs of technology transfer and monitoring of locally purchased goods,
the impact on entry mode is evident.
Proposition 7: Well designed quantity restrictions - those that increase profits in JVs -
applied selectively to foreign owned firms will increase the probability that MNCs
choose to enter via a JV.
Proof: These quantity restrictions cannot increase the profits of a WOS and are not
applied to local firms which engage in TPs. These facts and Proposition 5 imply the
conclusion.
The chief weakness of the quantity restrictions analyzed above is that they are
rather esoteric. It is hard to imagine that policy makers in developing countries have the
capabilities or knowledge regarding individual foreign owned operations to design
quantity restrictions which manage to balance the second-order gains achieved through
increased provision of management activities against the first-order losses imposed by
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employing inputs in a non-optimal fashion. However, there are alternative policy
instruments which can be employed to improve resource allocation in JVs.
3.2.2 PIGOUVIAN TAXES (SUBSIDIES) ON OBSERVABLE INPUTS
In order to examine the use of taxes and subsidies to ease the incentive
compatibility constraints, assume that the government subsidizes foreign owned firms’
purchases of a particular imported input, I1, at a rate “t” and collects a lump sum tax T
from these firms. The analysis assumes all changes in taxes are revenue neutral and are
in the neighborhood of an initial equilibrium with t=T=0.
Proposition 8: Starting at the no tax equilibrium, the introduction of a small tax or
subsidy on an observable imported input will increase JV profits unless












Proof: See Appendix D.
The intuition and the basic details from the discussion of quantity restrictions
continue to hold. As long as unobservable inputs are sensitive to some policy
instrument, through cross-price effects, the initial equilibrium will not be constrained
Pareto efficient. Pareto improving policies will increase the provision of one or both
unobservable inputs. Also, it can be seen that if the cross-price effects from input I1 are
both positive (negative), then the government should impose a subsidy (tax) in order to
increase JV profits. Finally, this policy will have no impact on WOS profits. Any
additional costs or savings will be offset by the change in the lump sum tax. Given this
and the fact that locally owned firms are not subject to this scheme, Proposition 5
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ensures that this policy will also increase the probability that a MNC will prefer to enter
via a JV.
This option has much greater practical relevance because it shows that incentive
schemes used to attract investors such as duty draw-backs of inputs and tariff-free
importation of capital goods have an additional benefit. To the extent that these inputs
are complementary to the MNC technological asset, such incentive schemes motivate
MNCs to increase efforts devoted to technology transfer. The benefits of these policies
are not without limit. Eventually, the cost of over-employing observable inputs
outweighs the gain of employing unobservable inputs at a point nearer their marginal
cost.37
While these results are intriguing, it is even more interesting to compare the
results above to the policies such as export promotion programs, local content regimes,
and profit taxation.38 The only impact of these policies in earlier models is the
deterrence of MNC entry. This limits the welfare costs created by MNCs given tariffs
and other pre-existing distortions. These policies will encourage some MNCs to look to
other countries; others will still enter and their behavior will be affected by the policies.
Since host governments frequently seek out foreign investors so that the developing
country can gain access to advanced technology, the impact of these policies on
technology transfer is of particular interest. In order to derive concrete results regarding
unobservable inputs, this model follows Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) and Bhattacharyya
and Lafontaine (1995) and analyzes the case of Cobb-Douglas production technology
                                                
37 The incentive compatibility constraints will still bind and therefore the marginal value of the
unobservable inputs in the JV will still exceed the marginal cost of supplying them.
36
and constant marginal cost of providing managerial efforts. Derivations and proofs are
contained in Appendix D.
3.2.3 EXPORT PROMOTION POLICIES
In order to capture the impact of export promotion policies we must explicitly
introduce the price of output sold , PD
Out  to our model.39 Following Rodrik (1987), the
impact of an export requirement is modeled as a reduction in the “effective” price
realized by the JV. Given a tariff jumping motive for choosing local production over
trade, output is sold at a higher price domestically than on the world market,
PD
Out > PF
Out . Therefore if the export performance requirement dictates that foreign firms
must export a fraction, µ, of their output, the effective price ( PE
Out ) equals a weighted
average of the domestic and world prices ( PE
Out  = µ * PF
Out  * (1-µ)* PD
Out ). Clearly, with
a positive export performance requirement, PE
Out  < PD
O u t .
Export promotion policies never increase the profitability of foreign owned
firms.40 Given this, Proposition 5 guarantees these policies increase likelihood that
MNCs choose to allow local firms to “go it alone” by exchanging technology in an
arm’s length fashion.
Proposition 8: Given Cobb-Douglas technology and constant marginal cost of providing
managerial inputs and a tariff hopping motive for foreign investment, binding export
promotion policies will discourage the use of joint ventures, diminish profits, and lead
to lower provision of unobservable inputs.
                                                                                                                                              
38 Rodrik (1987) and Chao and Yu (1996) recommend an export promotion scheme, Lahiri and Ono
(1998) and Batra (1986) support a profit or revenue based tax, and Lahiri and Ono (1998) recommend
local content restrictions.
39 Equation 6 needs to be amended as follows: Max {L,E}  PD
Out F(I,L,e,c;B,δ)-wL-pI.
40 Standard properties of the profit function ensure that this is true for WOSs and it is easy to prove this
property continues to hold for JVs.
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Proof: Changes in export performance requirements have the same impact as changes in
the price of output. The effects of changes in P Out  are analyzed in Propositions D1 and
D2 of Appendix D.
Using data from a recent survey of Japanese executives in MNCs, Mody,
Dasgupta and Sinha (1999) found that these executives both perceived export
promotion policies to be a significant barrier to FDI and acted on these beliefs. Since
export promotion policies have a negative impact on entry decisions, MNCs must
believe that there is something to be gained by producing locally for the local market.
As export promotion policies erode these gains, they erode the incentive for MNCs to
transfer technology as well.
Export growth is frequently prescribed to promote competition and spur the
adoption of new technology. In this model, firms are perfectly competitive and there is
only a single time period. This essentially assumes away the traditional gains. However,
this model sharpens the focus on the adverse impact on the incentive compatibility
constraints. Before analyzing local content requirements, note that the impact of sales
and revenue taxes is the same as the export promotion policy.
3.2.4 SALES AND REVENUE TAXATION
Proposition 9: Given Cobb-Douglas technology and constant marginal cost of providing
managerial inputs, revenue or sales taxes will have the exact same impact as the export
promotion policy. Namely these taxes will diminish profits earned by foreign firms,
discourage the use of JVs, and decrease the supply of unobservable inputs.
Proof: See Appendix D Propositions D1 and D2.
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3.2.5 TRADITIONAL LOCAL CONTENT REQUIREMENTS
Local content regulation generally dictates a minimum percentage of inputs
which must be purchased locally. For simplicity, assume that I and L are scalars and
represent imported inputs and locally purchased inputs respectively. This gives




where φ is the percentage of inputs that must be purchased locally. Notice the constraint
can be re-written




−1  is the required ratio of domestic inputs to imported inputs.
Proposition 10: With Cobb-Douglas production technology and constant marginal cost
of providing unobservable inputs, binding local content policies will reduce JV profits,
reduce WOS profits, and decrease the amount of unobservable resources in all firms
with foreign ownership. Further, local content policies will decrease the probability that
MNCs choose to form joint ventures.
Proof: See Appendix A, Propositions A3 and A4.
Binding local content policies act like a subsidy on locally purchased inputs and
a tax on imported inputs. The discussion of quantity and tax instruments involved only a
single input as this was sufficient to show the JV equilibrium was not constrained
Pareto optimal. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) and Arnott and Stiglitz (1987) show that
the optimal policy involved varying the rate of taxation or subsidy across all goods
depending on their degree of substitutability or complementary with unobserved inputs.
It is unlikely that a local content policy is an approximation of an optimal intervention.
In a many goods model, this would require that all locally purchased inputs be equally
39
complementary with all unobserved inputs and all imported inputs be equal substitutes
for all unobserved inputs. Policies aimed at easing the incentive constraints require a
delicate touch and not an overbearing hand.
3.3 CONCLUSION
The hallmark of a good policy intervention is that the policy is targeted
explicitly at easing incentive compatibility constraints. Perhaps their blunt and heavy
handed nature is the hallmark of frequently used policies in LDCs. As another example
of such policies consider the impact of a legal limit to the foreign ownership percentage.
Obviously, this would eliminate the possibility that a foreign corporation will enter via
a WOS. In terms of Figure 2.1, the only relevant constraint is the vertical line. Since
there are MNCs which would prefer to enter via a WOS, this policy introduces shirking
behavior where before there was none. There is a clear negative impact on technology
transfer. Developing countries that seek to promote technology spillovers by forcing
MNCs to enter via shared equity or force MNCs to take a smaller equity stake than the
MNC would otherwise find optimal, need to be aware of this effect of their policy.
Table 3.1 summarizes and compares the results of our analysis of the widely
used policies to the first two policies. The distinction between good and bad policy
interventions is stark. The quantity and price instruments in Table 3.1 are employed in
such a fashion that they ease the incentive constraints. The policies achieve this result
by promoting the use of inputs that increase the marginal value of non-contractible
inputs.
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Table 3.1: Policy Comparisons




Quantity Instrument* Increases** Increases** Increases**
Price Instrument* Increases** Increases** Increases**
Export Promotion Decreases Decreases Decreases
Sales Tax Decreases Decreases Decreases
Local Content % Decreases Decreases Decreases
*The effects assume the instrument is employed appropriately.
** These results are independent of functional form.
The supply of these non-contractible goods is increased accordingly.
Given developing countries quest for advanced technology and the fact that the
original equilibrium was not constrained Pareto optimal, any intervention which
achieves this will be welcomed by all parties. The good news is that there are
significant benefits to getting interventions right. However, a frequent complaint among
developing nations is that local entrepreneurs have not realized any spillover benefits
from MNCs and in fact MNCs transfer little technology to their local facilities. This too
can be easily explained in the context of this model.
For example, Thee and Pangestu (1996) studied technological capabilities in the
Indonesian manufacturing sector. They lament that “ the [industrial technological
capabilities] of even foreign-controlled JVs have not achieved international best
practice.” Despite relative openness to FDI since the late 1960’s, Indonesia has
employed restrictions to ownership percentage, export promotion policies and local
content policies. Each of these can diminish the incentive to commit managerial effort
to the implementation of technology. This model suggests that the low capabilities of
many affiliates may be the result of policy makers’ failure to get certain key
interventions right, rather than malfeasance on behalf of MNC executives. It is possible
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for LDC governments to simultaneously promote technology transfer and to promote
the establishment of joint ventures. However, many of the policies which prior research
has urged LDCs to adopt can have deleterious effects on each of these goals.
While it is possible for governments to engage in Pareto interventions, this will
only be necessary if the firms are unable to undertake such actions on their own.41
Arora (1996) examines one such possible intervention. Multinational firms bundle sales
of inputs that are complementary to effort in arm’s length technology. Such an approach
is beneficial because it promotes the provision of an unobservable resource as well. In
fact, the model presented in Arora can be viewed as a special case of the model
analyzed in this dissertation. There are two reasons why LDC governments may still
find a need for interventions. First, the difficulty of observing and enforcing compliance
to more complex contracts in a developing country environment may hinder private
Pareto improving actions. Second, the LDC government may choose to use these
instruments to capture some of the rents earned by the multinational.42
                                                
41 I thank Dan Vincent making this observation.
42 I owe Arvind Panagariya for making this comment.
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CHAPTER 4: DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP SHARE AT
AGGREGATE AND MICRO LEVEL
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The model developed in Chapter 2 provides testable implications regarding the
determination of foreign ownership at the plant level. Ownership is granted to provide
an incentive to contribute managerial resources. Therefore, theory predicts that foreign
ownership share varies directly with the importance of MNC’s contribution and
inversely with the importance of the local partner’s contribution. Further, as an
experienced MNC (local firm) is fully capable of performing all managerial tasks,
foreign ownership percentage varies directly (inversely) with MNC (local firm)
experience. Some of these characteristics should certainly be the same throughout an
industry. However, one must be careful not to confuse the determination of plant or firm
level foreign ownership shares with the share of industrial output produced by foreign
owned firms in a given industry. While the latter issue has been extensively studied43,
the former remains virtually unexamined. 44
Aswicahyono and Hill (1995) may claim that “the link between the determinants
of MNC shares in a given industry and the MNC’s equity share in its subsidiaries is a
powerful one,” but this actually remains an untested proposition. Evidence does
                                                
43 Dunning (1993) provides a survey of the literature on inter-industry variations in foreign investment.
See also Caves (1974) for developed countries and Lall and Mohammed (1983) for developing nations.
Aswicahyono and Hill (1995) find that many of these propositions are in general true for Indonesia, the
country considered in this research.
44 Empirical studies such as Yu (1990), Gomes-Casseres (1989, 1990), Kogut and Singh (1988) and
Beamish and Banks (1987) have examined each of the entry modes discussed in this dissertation: wholly-
owned subsidiaries, an equity joint ventures, and an arm’s length exchange of proprietary assets.
However, the dependent variable was categorical and did not specifially examine the ownership share.
These results were discussed in Chapter 2 in relation to this model’s consistency with certain stylized
facts.
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indicate that MNCs have a large presence in industries that demonstrate significant
scale economies and other barriers to entry, however there is merely a strong
presumption that these same factors are important at the micro level. This confusion
may arise because the literature on MNC entry mode employs some of these same
industry level characteristics, along with characteristics of the particular MNC and
perhaps the recipient nation. These studies do not constitute the sort of evidence needed
to make such strong claims. Although similar in logic to the model presented in this
dissertation, prior studies of MNC entry mode have failed to recognize a few key
theoretical implications and have employed indicator variables for various entry-modes
rather than the continuous (although censored) percentage ownership variable analyzed
here.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that this empirical model is quite
similar to that employed by LaFontaine (1992) and Lafontaine and Shaw (1995) to
examine whether risk, bi-lateral moral hazard, or capital market imperfections were the
cause of franchising agreements in the US retail sector. However, the methodology
employed here represents a significant improvement of this earlier approach in that
obvious endogeneity issues are addressed.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3 presents the data,
summarizes the results of Aswicahyono and Hill (1995) and conducts a similar analysis
of  inter-industry variation in foreign ownership share in the Indonesian manufacturing
sector. Section 3 develops an empirical model of the determinants of foreign ownership
at the plant level. This is a simplified version of the model developed and analyzed in
earlier chapters. Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
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4.2 DATA AND INDUSTRY LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN
OWNERSHIP
The data employed in this chapter are drawn from two sources, each produced
by the Indonesian Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Board of Statistics - BPS). Since 1975,
BPS has conducted the Survei Tahunan Perusahaan Industri Sedang dan Besar (Annual
Survey of Medium and Large Industrial Establishments - SI) to collect detailed data on
output, input, value added, costs, location and ownership. All data are collected at the
establishment or plant level and include establishments with twenty or more employees.
For a more detailed discussion of the data, see Appendix E.  The current work will
focus on data for 1993-1995. This corresponds to the period for which foreign entries
for each of the possible entry modes can be identified.45 Such entries are identified by
one of three conditions: an existing locally owned plant reports (for the first time)
positive foreign equity, an existing locally owned plant reports (for the first time)
paying management and royalty fees to a multinational46 firm, or a plant begins
operations with positive foreign equity or positive royalties or management fees. All
export oriented foreign entries are include in the estimation.
In order to verify that the same forces drive aggregate foreign presence in
Indonesia, attention is temporarily directed towards the industry level determinants of
foreign presence. Aswicahyono and Hill (1995) use the same data as are employed in
this dissertation, except they employ an earlier time period, 1985. Data are aggregated
to the 5-digit ISIC level to analyze inter-industry variation in ownership shares.
                                                
45 BPS began reporting data on royalties and management fees paid in 1992.
46 Although the data field does not require that these fees be paid to non-Indonesian firms, conversations
with officials at the Central Board of Statistics indicate that this was the intent of the question and highly
likely to be the case.
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Improvements to BPS data collection and certain policy changes indicate that further
analysis using updated data is warranted.
Aswicahyono and Hill do not find that advertising or R&D shares are significant
predictors of the foreign share of industry output, however they do find that the foreign
share increases with other industry variables that are indicative of scale economies and
entry barriers47.  The authors also find that government regulation has a significant
impact on the foreign share of industry output. They offer three pieces of evidence for
this fact. A dummy variable for industries in which foreign investment is expressly
prohibited deters foreign investment as does a large government share of industry
output. Finally, results are sensitive to the exact definition of foreign share. If “foreign
output” is defined to include only 100% foreign owned enterprises or foreign/private
JVs, few if any conclusions can be drawn from the data. When “foreign share” is
defined to include foreign/government JVs, except those in 5 industries in which the
authors deem government to be the dominant partner48, the authors demonstrate the
results discussed above.
                                                
47 Minimum Efficient Production Scale (MEPS) which equals the average output of all firms in the upper
half of the output distribution relative to the average for the lower half of the distribution, the Four Plant
Concentration Ratio (CR4), the Herfindahl Index, Non-Wage Value Added are all significant predictors
of an increased foreign share of output.
48 These industries are sugar, fertilizer, cement, basic metals and ship building.
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Table 4.1: Output Shares by Ownership Group
Industry Private Government* For/Priv JV For/Gov** JV Foreign
1985 1995 1985 1995 1985 1995 1985 1995 1985 1995
31100 FOOD1 60.14 70.44 30.11 16.25 6.54 10.11 0.33 0.59 2.88 2.6
31200 FOOD2 69.89 66.21 10.62 5.35 18.81 25.01 0.08 0.13 0.6 3.3
31300 BEVERAGES 50.68 59.02 0.13 0.01 36.53 35.34 12.66 . . 5.63
31400 TOBACCO & CIGARETTES 94.39 95.15 1.17 0.28 3.79 3.64 0.15 . 0.51 0.94
32100 TEXTILES 65.83 81.61 7.97 1.96 23.08 15.08 0.87 0.81 2.25 0.53
32200 CLOTHES EXCL FOOTWEAR 95.95 67.86 3.01 1.18 1.04 28.66 . 0.1 . 2.21
32300 TANNERIES AND LEATHER EXCL 82.99 80.75 8.1 3.45 0.32 15.13 . . 8.58 0.68
32400 FOOTWEAR 51.63 51.4 6.44 0.62 41.94 43.02 . . . 4.95
33100 WOOD ETC. 81.85 87.61 3.33 0.88 13.76 10.58 0.2 . 0.86 0.93
33200 WOOD FURNITURE 86.17 87.03 10.37 0.63 3.46 11.34 . . . 1
34100 PAPER & PAPER PRODUCTS 64.94 57.57 16.02 7.07 19.04 35.32 . . . 0.04
34200 PRINTING & PUBLISHING 74.27 67.45 21.58 20.99 0.51 11.56 3.64 . . .
35100 INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL 17.55 29.27 65.24 34.19 16.5 35.32 0.03 0.45 0.68 0.77
35200 OTHER CHEMICAL 51.48 48.27 4.93 4.23 33.99 44.5 6.57 . 3.04 3
35400 PRODUCTS OF PETROLEUM REF & COAL 100 53.1 . . . 15.15 . 7.8 . 23.94
35500 RUBBER & RUBBER PRODUCTS 66.2 69.4 9.44 6.64 15.36 16.14 0.05 0.49 8.95 7.34
35600 PLASTIC PRODUCTS 88.02 72.31 0.4 0.28 11.57 16.73 . . . 10.68
36100 PORCELAIN 88.98 76.64 1.98 2.27 9.04 20.17 . . . 0.92
36200 GLASS & GLASS PRODUCTS 29.96 77.64 3.92 5.09 66.13 17.28 . . . .
36300 CEMENT AND CEMENT PRODUCTS 22.72 30.21 64 51.11 12.69 13 0.59 . . 5.68
36400 CLAY PRODUCTS 86.79 87.52 4.4 2.69 8.81 9.78 . . . .
36900 OTHER NON-METL MIN PRODUCTS 89.31 91.68 10.69 2.07 . 6.26 . . . .
37100 IRON AND STEEL BASIC IND 21.24 30.56 72.69 42.9 6.08 26.51 . . . 0.03
37200 NON-FERROUS METAL BASIC IND 98.26 47.87 1.74 38.28 . 11.79 . . . 2.06
38100 FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS EXCL 60.68 56.85 8.8 1.04 27.92 40.83 2.59 0.73 . 0.55
38200 MACHINERY EXCL ELECTRICAL 37.26 45.85 19.04 7.55 34.55 39.57 7.97 0.21 1.18 6.83
38300 ELEC MACH APPARATUS, APPLIANCES & 54.45 36.71 2.62 3.6 27.97 42.28 5.59 0.75 9.36 16.66
38400 TRANSPORT EQUIP 67.34 53.73 18.72 6.97 13.94 34.53 . . . 4.78
38500 PROFESSIONAL SCIENTIFIC EQUIP 72.37 50.18 0.09 . 27.54 25.76 . . . 24.05
39000 OTHER MANUFACTURING 65.03 45.99 1.07 0.02 33.9 51.06 . . . 2.93
Source: Unpublished BPS data 
*Government sector includes sectors where government is dominant partner in the JVs.
** Excludes sectors where the government is deemed the dominant partner
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Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present some summary information regarding the foreign
presence in Indonesia. In 1986, Indonesia began a process of liberalizing its investment
environment.49 Table 4.1 shows the change in the structure Indonesian industry between
1985 and 1995 at the 3-digit ISIC.50 The foreign share of industries has shown a
dramatic response. Much of this has been channeled through foreign/private JVs. Until
1992, there was a prohibition on 100% foreign ownership, between 1992 and May
1994, 100%  ownership was allowed provided the investor met certain qualifications
regarding capital investment, export propensity, location, and future transfer of equity
to Indonesian interests (phase-down requirements). In 1994, phase-down requirements
were liberalized51and the other qualifications were eliminated. It is interesting to note
that in the vast majority of industries, the private sector has maintained its share of
production. It has only lost a considerable share to foreign firms in three of the
relatively high-tech sectors.
Table 4.2 identifies start-up plants that are involved with foreign corporations.
Zero-equity start-ups are identified as those plants that report a positive value for
royalty payments and 0% foreign equity in their initial year of production.52 The table
contains
                                                
49 This process was gradual and intermittent from 1986-1992 and then followed by a big bang in May
1994. Pangestu (1996) provides a complete discussion of these issues.
50 The data presented are output shares, where output is taken from the Backcast Data. There are no data
on equity shares from this source, so these data were taken from the annual Industrial Survey. Those
observations where a particular plant has data in the Backcast, but not the annual survey (i.e., years
before BPS “found” the plant in question) the equity shares are assumed to be the same as the initial year
the plant appears in the annual survey. For the present purposes, this seems to be an innocuous
assumption. Further, Jammal (1993) discusses the misleading conclusions that can be drawn if only the
raw Industrial Survey data are employed.
51 Some of equity, the amount to be determined by the foreign investor, had to be transferred to national
interests within 15 years.
52 Although the questionnaire does not stipulate that these payments are made to foreign corporations,
interviews with officials at BPS indicate that this is the intention.
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Table 4.2: Frequency Distribution of Foreign Start-Ups and Total Plants by Equity
Class
Ownership Percentages
Year 0% 1%-40% 41%-60% 61%-99% 100%
Start-Ups
1992 12.12 9.1 28.79 37.88 12.12
1993 8.54 7.32 32.92 39.03 12.2
1994 16.96 8.93 16.97 26.79 30.36
1995 30.11 2.16 10.76 16.14 40.86
Total Plants
1995 30.61 6.87 21.03 28.79 12.69
the percentages of foreign start-ups in each of the categories. For instance, in 1992,
12.12% of the start-up plants that were involved with foreign corporations did so in an
arm’s length fashion, while a further 12.12% were 100% foreign owned subsidiaries.
The final row focuses on all plants operating in 1995 that are associated with foreign
firms. In 1995, 30.6% of all “foreign” firms actually have no foreign equity investment.
Only 12.7% are 100% foreign-owned subsidiaries. These numbers demonstrate the
claim put forward in the introduction to this dissertation. Namely, theoretical models of
FDI that implicitly or explicitly restrict their attention to 100% MNC owned
subsidiaries fail to explain a significant proportion of MNC involvement in developing
country markets.
Studies of inter-industry variation in ownership shares are conducted using
industry aggregate statistics. Here observations for 336 5-digit ISIC industries are
analyzed. Table 4.3 list the variables employed in the analysis and Table 4.4 replicates
Aswicahyono and Hill’s (1995) regressions for the more recent time period. As noted,
some changes result from refinements to the data collection and to regulatory changes.
In particular R&D, advertising, as well as skilled labor are directly measured.
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Additionally, regulatory changes have necessitated a different definition of D1, the
dummy variable for industries with direct restrictions on foreign ownership until the
reforms of 199453. In her study of the determinants of franchising agreements,
LaFontaine (1992) measures risk as the number of failures in the industry. The impact
of this variable is also considered.
Table 4.3: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition*
FP_SHR Output Share by Foreign Firms or Foreign/Private JVs
FPGS_SHR Output Share by Foreign Firms,  Foreign/Private JVs,
 or Foreign/Government JVs
M5ADVOUT Avg. Advertising/Output:5-Digit Industry
M5RDOUT Avg. R&D/Output:5-Digit Industry
M5SKLLF1 Avg. (Skill Labor)/(Total Labor):5-Digit Industry
M5NWGVA Avg. Non-Wage VA per Worker:5-Digit Industry
GS_SHR Output Share of Government Owned Plants: Excluding JVs
D1 Dummy: Direct Foreign Ownership Restriction
CR4_5D Four Plant Concentration Ratio: 5 Digit Industry
MEPS_5D Minimum Efficient Scale: 5 Digit Industry
AVGEXT_5 Avg. # Annual Exits '92-'94:5 Digit Industry
* Precise definitions are provided in Footnote 5.
The results clearly demonstrate that MNCs are drawn to industries with high
entry barriers. The proxy for capital intensity (M5NWGVA), concentration (CR4_5D),
and economies of scale (MES_5D) are highly significant in all specifications. This
confirms many of the classic results in the literature. Advertising and R&D
expenditures are thought to generate the intangible assets frequently possessed by
MNCs.  Although they have the proper sign, these variables are never significantly
different from zero. This is an important distinction from the research on developed
economies. Aswicahyono and Hill (1995) found a similar result with their proxies for
                                                
53 A review of investment regulations indicates that the chief changes here are that the garment industry
was opened to foreign ownership (1989) and the woods products industry was closed.
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these variables. This result adds further credence to the opinion expressed in this work
and Lall and Mohammed (1983) that there may be different motivations behind FDI in
developed and developing nations.
As was discussed above, restrictions on foreign ownership in Indonesia were
gradually eased between 1986 and 1992, and then virtually eliminated in 1994. In the
highly regulated environment of the mid-1980’s, Aswicahyono and Hill found that the
small 100% foreign owned and foreign/private joint venture shares did not respond to
Table 4.4: Industry Level Analysis
Independent Variable
FP_SHR FP_SHR  FPGS_SHR  FPGS_SHR
INTERCEPT -0.489*** -0.485*** -0.443*** -0.440***
(0.143) (0.144) (0.147) (0.148)
M5ADVOUT 1.367 1.344 1.284 1.266
(2.421) (2.426) (2.484) (2.489)
M5RDOUT 8.237 8.179 6.104 6.055
(10.766) (10.784) (11.046) (11.065)
M5SKLLF1 -0.131 -0.128 -0.140* -0.138
(0.081) (0.082) (0.084) (0.084)
M5NWGVA 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
GS_SHR -0.442*** -0.441*** -0.343*** -0.342***
(0.085) (0.085) (0.088) (0.088)
D1 -0.067 -0.066 -0.069 -0.068
(0.057) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059)
CR4_5D 0.338*** 0.332*** 0.329*** 0.325***
(0.075) (0.078) (0.077) (0.080)
MEPS_5D 0.347*** 0.347*** 0.324*** 0.325***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.066)
AVGEXT_5 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.17
n 336 336 336 336
Standard errors in parentheses
*** 1% significance, ** 5% significance, * 10% significance
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the explanatory variables suggested in the literature. The current results indicate that
this is no longer the case. Further, as regulatory authorities have allowed exceptions to
their direct prohibition of foreign ownership and then eliminated these restrictions in
nearly all manufacturing industries54, the impact of this layer of red tape has
diminished. Whereas D1 was highly significant in the earlier study, it is not
significantly different from zero here. However, the fact that multinationals remain
deterred by the government share of output indicates that the domestic policy
environment still matters for foreign investors. Finally, it cannot be said that MNCs
avoid sectors of the economy with a high rate of business failures.
These results indicate that FDI in this developing economy generally responds
to the same pressures as FDI in developed countries. An important exception is the
impact of R&D and advertising intensity. It must be admitted, though, a subsidiary’s
expenditure on R&D and advertising may be a poor indicator of the MNC’s assets in
these areas. Aswicahyono and Hill (1995) claim that there is a close relationship
between determinants of the foreign owned share of industries and the foreign owned
share of firms. If this is true, foreign firms should demand a greater ownership
percentage as the size of the project increases and when other indicators of economies
of scale are present. This test can be incorporated in the modeling framework to be
developed in the following section.
                                                
54 In 1995, foreign ownership was prohibited only in the sawmill and milk products industries.
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4.3 EMPIRICAL MODEL
The main hypothesis to be tested here is that bi-lateral moral hazard is the
driving force behind the determination of equity share in foreign establishments. These
arrangements are very similar to other forms of share contracts such as franchising
agreements and sharecropping. Accordingly, similar competing explanations have been
offered in each of these three areas. Contractor (1985) cites a number of reasons why
arm’s length exchange of MNCs’ proprietary assets may not be feasible. Risk sharing
and the implicit insurance provided with a share contract is one alternative explanation.
In the case of a MNC, the profitability of its technological asset is not guaranteed given
the new cultural and institutional environment in an LDC. Local firms may be unwilling
to bear the risk of these projects. To the extent that this explanation of equity sharing is
true and to the extent the MNCs are less risk averse, foreign ownership percentage
should be higher for plants in riskier industries. Additionally, if Aswicahyono and Hill
(1995) are correct, barriers to entry and measures of scale economies lead to higher
foreign ownership percentage. Conversely, Chapter 2 demonstrated that under fairly
general circumstances ownership percentage is independent of scale. This is clearly
testable.
The theoretical discussion in Chapter 2 was motivated by the observation that
both MNCs and their local partners contribute managerial resources to joint ventures. It
is commonly believed that MNCs are sought out for two broad types of resources:55
technological expertise and international marketing expertise. Similarly, local firms
provide knowledge of the local economy and local distribution networks. Appendix H
                                                
55 Caves (1996) provides a review.
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presents a version of the model developed in Chapter 2 which is quite similar to Aitken,
Hanson and Harrison (1994). The important distinction is that in this dissertation the
simultaneity of the ownership and export orientation decisions is modeled. The novel
insight in this dissertation is that the value of MNC marketing expertise is greater in
export oriented firms which increases the incentive for a MNC to take an ownership
stake. It has long been recognized that MNC owned firms face a lower marginal cost of
exporting.
To allow a role for managerial resources, it is assumed that production costs and
international marketing costs are decreasing functions of the amount of  unobservable
managerial resources provided by the MNC. Likewise, it is assumed that production
costs and domestic marketing costs are a decreasing function of unobservable
managerial resources provided by the local partner. Ownership provides the incentive to
contribute these managerial resources. As in Chapter 2 and following Eswaran and
Kotwal (1985), the incentive compatibility constraints can be solved simultaneously to
give e and c as functions of the ownership percentage. This leaves multinationals with
two key choice variables: ownership percentage and export orientation.
For the purpose of the empirical estimation let
1
*y = PCT_FOR=foreign
ownership percentage and let
2
*y = PCT_EXP=percentage of goods exported. Assume
the solution to the model presented in Appendix H can be represented according to the
following empirical model.
 (4.1)
1 1 2 1 1 1i i i iy y x u
* '= + +β γ
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(4.2)
2 2 1 2 2 2i i i iy y x u
* '= + +α γ





The first thing to be noticed is that in the case of an arm’s length entry, the
foreign ownership percentage will equal zero and in the case of a WOS, the foreign
ownership percentage will equal 1. If 
1iy
*
equals the latent value of foreign ownership
percentage, let 
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Additionally, note that 
2iy
*
 depends on the observed, 
1iy , rather than the latent value
of the foreign ownership percentage, 
1iy
*
. The reason for this is obvious. Because of the
incentive compatibility constraints, the marginal cost of exporting will depend on the
realized foreign ownership share. Likewise the higher the realized value of export share,
the greater the value of  MNC management effort and the greater the chosen value of
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1iy . While theoretically appealing, this leads to certain empirical difficulties. Namely,
there will not be a unique reduced form and the usual estimation approach is not
applicable.56  However, the parameters of this model can be consistently estimated via
the two-stage methodology proposed by Blundell and Smith (1994). For details of the
estimation procedure and asymptotic distribution of the estimates see Appendix F.
Essentially, the equation for 
2iy ,(4.2), is estimated via instrumental variables and then
the portion of exports not explained by foreign ownership, ~ *y y yi i i2 2 2 1= −α , where
α 2  is the IV estimate, is substituted for 2iy
*
  and the IV residual, 2iu$ , are include in the
standard maximum likelihood estimation of (4.1). The basic estimating equation is (See
equation (F3a) in Appendix F.)
(4.5)
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1i i i i iy y x u
* * ' * * *~$ $ $= + + +  β γ ρ ε
Finally, notice that the discussion in Chapter 2 and model in Appendix H
provide insights regarding the choice of exogenous variables. In general, the foreign
ownership percentage is affected by three types of variables: indicators of MNC skill
and experience, indicators of the local counterparts skill and experience and indicators
of marginal cost reductions due the provision of managerial resources. In particular,
Figures 2.1-2.3 indicate that the foreign ownership percentage will be an increasing
function of the MNC’s experience and a decreasing function of the local firm’s
                                                
56 When the model is endogenous in the latent variables a unique reduced forms exists an the model can
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experience. An experienced local firm will be able to perform all managerial tasks
capably. Therefore since there is little to be gained by the MNC performing these tasks,
there is little need for the MNC to take a large ownership stake. As MNC managerial
contributions are relatively more important, there will be greater production cost
savings associated with their provision of managerial talent and an increased incentive
for it to take a substantial ownership stake.
 Unfortunately, there are no data on the foreign partner in the database.
However, 1ix'  will contain variables indicative of the local partner’s skill and experience
(age and prior exporting experience) as well as production cost savings from the MNC
provision of managerial effort (Non-Wage Value added per worker, % Skilled Labor, %
Loans Foreign and industry dummies) and production cost savings from local firm
provision of managerial effort (% inputs purchased locally, crony industries, regulated
industries). Notice that this model interprets these included exogenous variable as
indicating the relative importance of providing managerial effort to the supervision of
supply and distribution networks, the supervision of international financial
arrangements, the supervision of embodied technology transfer and the supervision of
local regulatory requirements. Finally, variables suggested by alternative theories (risk,
size and concentration) will be included. Additionally, 2ix '  will include exogenous
variables that affect the relative costs and benefits of exporting (prior experience
exporting, NTBs, and tariffs, as well as industry dummies). Table 4.5 contains summary
statistics and definitions for the key variables included in the empirical analysis.
                                                                                                                                              
be estimated according to Amemiya (1979) or Nelson and Olsen (1978).
57
 Table 4.5: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Variable Label N Mean Std Dev
PCT_FOR Percent Foreign Owned 880 25.09318 38.03002
PCT_EXP Percent Export 880 70.24773 32.58653
Y2TILDA PCT_EXP: Adjusted According to
Blundell and Smith (1994)
880 66.92695 32.3319
SKLLF1 Total Skilled labor/Total Labor 880 45.3505 30.59768
NWAGEVA Non-wage Value Added per Employee 880 13399.77 36054.04
PCT_LNF % Loans Foreign 880 10.29977 28.61467
EXPLSTYR Dummy=1 iff Exported in Previous Year 880 0.539773 0.498699
AGE Plant age 880 10.32614 10.88441
CRONY Crony Industry Dummy
(Basri and Hill (1996))
880 0.085227 0.279378
D1 Ownership Prohibition
(Aswicahyono and Hill (1995))
880 0.236364 0.42509
D2 Government Dominated Industry
(Aswicahyono and Hill(1995))
880 0.022727 0.149117
PCT_COMD % of Commodities Purchased
Domestically
880 74.47587 36.99001
PCT_SPRD % of Spare Parts Purchased Domestically 880 76.92241 39.834
AVGEXT5D Avg # Annual Exits Previous 5 Years
5 Digit Industry
880 39.01409 66.5817
CR4_5D Four Plant Concentration Ratio
5 Digit Industry
880 0.37799 0.247791
MES_5D Minimum Efficient Scale
5 Digit Annual: 5 Digit Industry
880 1.861351 0.124884
OUT_BKR Real Output 880 24985934 69753584
U2HATIV First Stage Residual Values 880 -3.54E-14 27.38243
4.4 RESULTS
The results of both a standard 2-limit Tobit and the two stage approach which
corrects for possible endogeneity bias resulting from the inclusion of export percentage
indicate substantial support for the proposition that bi-lateral moral hazard is a driving
force behind the determination of ownership at the plant level. In fact, little if any
support for alternative theories is found. Results indicate that the determination of
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Table 4.6: Standard 2-Limit Tobit
Standard 2-Limit Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PCT_EXP 0.6465*** 0.6456*** 0.6548*** 0.6437*** 0.6223***
(0.1493) (0.1491) (0.1495) (0.149) (0.1486)
INTERCEPT 19.1745 19.5049 6.54 73.7819 20.9396
(26.3553) (26.309) (30.7979) (73.6935) (26.183)
SKLLF1 0.0444 0.0343 0.0391 0.0399 0.0367
(0.1748) (0.1749) (0.1748) (0.1748) (0.1742)
NWAGEVA 0.205** 0.2048** 0.2039** 0.2103** 0.2879***
(0.0975) (0.0973) (0.0972) (0.0975) (0.1107)
PCT_LNF 0.7752*** 0.7743*** 0.7646*** 0.7666*** 0.797***
(0.1271) (0.1268) (0.1271) (0.127) (0.12750
EXPLSTYR -68.5691*** -68.1443*** -67.7167*** -68.2113*** -66.4362***
(8.9062) (8.8953) (8.8937) (8.8904) (8.9092)
AGE -1.4429*** -1.4107*** -1.3573*** -1.39*** -1.2461
(0.4943) (0.4931) (0.4948) (0.4928) (0.4992)
CRONY -28.7391 -28.0752 -29.9111 -26.2716 -28.016
(19.2804) (19.2448) (19.3605) (19.3286) (19.2228)
D1 -73.0255 -73.6809 -75.1133 -71.8135 -73.543
(39.5839) (39.5557) (39.3906) (39.6571) (39.2875)
D2 -70.9436 -71.5268 -79.4875 -70.1458 -63.9781
(53.3264) (53.1155) (54.1193) (52.8668) (53.7922)
PCT_COMD -0.4423*** -0.4283*** -0.4302*** -0.4323*** -0.4437***
(0.1236) (0.1243) (0.1242) (0.1244) (0.1243)
PCT_SPRD -0.3888*** -0.3938*** -0.3843*** -0.3912*** -0.3915***
(0.0977) (0.0977) (0.0982) (0.0977) (0.0973)
AVGEXT5D -0.143 -0.0904 -0.1165 -0.1511







Pseudo-R2 0.444596 0.444767 0.444126 0.444254 0.451703
All Regressions Include Industry Dummies Standard errors in parentheses
*** 1% significance, ** 5% significance, * 10% significance
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Table 4.7: Two Stage 2-Limit Tobit
Two Stage 2-Limit Tobit
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PCT_EXP 2.9542*** 2.9806*** 2.9682*** 2.9452*** 3.2162***
(0.9209) (0.9288) (0.9255) (0.9251) (0.9983)
INTERCEPT -174.582*** -176.566*** -178.347*** -164.376** -196.274***
(60.449) (60.7706) (61.1327) (71.0396) (63.8511)
SKLLF1 0.155** 0.1472** 0.1488** 0.1485** 0.1456**
(0.0742) (0.0734) (0.0737) (0.0739) (0.071)
NWAGEVA 0.1359** 0.1354** 0.1355** 0.1368** 0.2048***
(0.0597) (0.0595) (0.0596) (0.0600) (0.0714)
PCT_LNF 0.4682*** 0.465*** 0.4642*** 0.4673*** 0.4594***
(0.1285) (0.1284) (0.128) (0.1289) (0.1313)
EXPLSTYR -64.54*** -64.2467*** -64.1529*** -64.275*** -62.7422***
(17.9849) (18.0572) (17.9719) (17.8883) (18.8994)
AGE 0.4025 0.4476 0.4484 0.4213 0.8064
(0.5128) (0.5099) (0.5103) (0.5217) (0.4916)
CRONY -4.9784 -4.2609 -4.7915 -4.333 -1.4132
(8.3646) (8.2718) (8.4232) (8.3628) (7.6869)
D1 -40.2035*** -40.364** -40.8232*** -40.4663** -37.0503**
(15.7272) (15.7172) (15.8405) (15.7577) (14.9966)
D2 -55.3833*** -55.7365*** -57.593*** -55.7866*** -46.1869**
(20.2919) (20.3235) (20.9511) (20.3997) (18.9216)
PCT_COMD -0.2933*** -0.2824*** -0.2835*** -0.2851*** -0.2817***
(0.0861) (0.0844) (0.0846) (0.0854) (0.0859)
PCT_SPRD -0.256*** -0.2577*** -0.2563*** -0.2591*** -0.2437***
(0.0727) (0.0732) (0.073) (0.0735) (0.0722)
AVGEXT5D -0.0988 -0.0872 -0.0947 -0.1029







Pseudo R2 0.437947 0.438068 0.437663 0.437881 0.451157
All Regressions Include Industry Dummies
Standard errors in parentheses
*** 1% significance, ** 5% significance, * 10% significance
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ownership share at the micro-level and the determination of ownership share at the
aggregate level are two very different questions. Results are in Table 4.6 and Table
4.7.57
There are several clear results. The need for adequate supervision of supply and
distribution networks is a driving force behind the determination of ownership
percentage. PCT_EXP, PCT_COMD, and PCT_SPRD consistently have the appropriate
sign and are highly significant. Secondly, there is little if any support for any of the
competing theories. The measures of risk, barriers to entry and scale are never
significant and add little or no explanatory power to the regressions. Also, these
variables frequently have the wrong sign. For example, the inverse relation between
measured risk and foreign ownership percentage would have to indicate that the local
firm is less risk averse than the MNC if the risk-sharing hypothesis were true. Real
output also has an apparently wrong sign. An alternative interpretation of this result
would be that the most skilled plants are most able to grow and this same skill renders
the plant capable of engaging in TPs or taking a majority position in a JV. Finally,
correcting for endogeneity bias provides evidence that MNCs are granted ownership
shares to provide technological expertise and Indonesian partners are sought out for
their connections with regulatory agencies and industry cronies.
The methodology employed above is amenable to answering both whether
export percentage is endogenous and whether the system is endogenous in observable
                                                
57 For censored dependent variables, pseudo-R2 is defined by Laitila (1993). This measure can be
interpreted as the proportion of the variance of the dependent variable explained by the right hand side
variables. The measure can decrease with the inclusion of additional dependent variables. Laitila (1993)
notes that Monte Carlo simulations indicate that this is likely to happen with the inclusion of irrelevant
variables.
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or latent variables. Blundell and Smith (1994) show that endogeneity can be determined
through a test of significance on the parameter ρ1 , which is associated with the IV
residual 2iu$ . Notice that this is a test that the error terms in the equations for
2 1i iy y
* *and are uncorrelated. Further, Blundell and Smith (1994) show that a test of
whether the system is endogenous in the latent or observed variables can easily be





2 2 2i i iy x v
* '= +π .
Therefore, the predicted value of  
1iy
*
$  estimated from (4.5) should have no explanatory
power. This can be tested by estimating (4.7) by OLS and testing whether δ 1 0= .
(4.7) 
2 2 1 1 2i i i iy x y v
* ' *$= + +π δ
These results presented in Table 4.8 strongly indicate both that export
percentage and foreign ownership percentage are jointly determined and that the system
is endogenous in the observed variables.
Table 4.8: Endogeneity Tests*
Two Stage 2-Limit Tobit
Endogeneity Tests
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
δ 1 0.7722 0.7411 0.8230 0.7576 0.4537
(4.173) (3.994) (4.439) (4.081) (2.575)
ρ1 -2.9656 -2.9921 -2.977 -2.9566 -3.2444




Taken as a whole, these results indicate several significant conclusions. First
and foremost, ownership does appear to be employed as an incentive mechanism.
Consistent with the model based on bi-lateral moral hazard developed in this
dissertation, ownership is used to provide incentives to both the MNC and its local
partner. Further, the micro and macro determinants of ownership share are very
different. Also, notice that these results indicate that ownership and performance
variables are endogenously determined. Certainly, studies such as Aitken and Harrison
(1994), which regress the probability a firm is an exporter on “exogenous” variables
such as an indicator of foreign ownership, produce biased and inconsistent results.
Further, the results in this chapter indicate that care must be taken in correcting for this
bias. The incentive constraints ensure that the system is endogenous in observable
rather than latent variables. As such, traditional techniques are inappropriate and
Blundell and Smith (1994) show that these approaches may lead to overcorrections.
There are two significant caveats to these results. First, the analysis in this
chapter has been based on exporting firms. This was necessitated because in order to
produce consistent estimates at the first stage, Blundell and Smith (1994) must assume
that the second endogenous variable is drawn from an uncensored distribution.
Estimation following the approach suggested by Amemiya (1974) suggests that these
results are robust. However, a full maximum likelihood estimation of the model
developed in this chapter would be a worthwhile extension. Secondly, the maximum
likelihood estimation is based on the assumption of normality. The violation of this
assumption may create significant biases.
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CHAPTER 5: POLICY IMPLICATIONS.
The empirical results presented in Chapter 4 can be seen as strong evidence that
MNCs are indeed creatures of imperfection. Multinationals do operate in industries that
fall well short of the perfectly competitive paradigm. However, market failures of an
entirely different sort play an important role isn the interactions between MNCs and
their local partners. Because MNCs use ownership as an incentive to both themselves
and their local partners, incentive constraints play an important role in the ultimate
performance of MNC affiliates. For this reason, great care must be taken when enacting
public policy aimed at minimizing the social costs associated with non-competitive
industries. As was clearly demonstrated in Chapter 3, policies that other researchers
have proposed to attenuate such costs have the unintended consequence of distorting the
incentives faced by MNCs and diminishing the incentive to transfer technology.
This should be carefully noted by policy makers and economic researchers alike.
LDC governments may have bad policies to blame for the disappointing performance of
foreign owned firms. One of the recent puzzles in empirical work in the area of FDI has
been the lack of any plant-level evidence of spillovers from FDI.58 This dissertation
suggests a likely culprit and a fruitful line of future research. Namely, the interaction
between good and bad policies and realized benefits  - both internal and spillover - of
FDI.
Finally, it cannot be forgotten that the theory presented in Chapter 3, which was
supported by the plant-level empirical results in Chapter 4, indicate that there is room
                                                
58 See Haddad and Harrison (1993) and  Aitken and Harrison (1999).
64
for Pareto improving public policy. Countries that get their interventions right can enjoy
increased levels of technology transfer at no additional cost.
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APPENDIX A: NON-RESTRICTIVE NATURE OF LINEAR CONTRACTS
Proposition A1: Without loss of generality, the optimal sharing rule can be represented
by a linear contract.
Proof:  (Following Bhattacharyya and LaFontaine (1995) and Romano (1994))
Recall the contracting problem…
(A1) Max {ω(.), e,c} E {ω(Θ π (e,c)) -R(e)}
Subject to
(A2) ∂ E {ω(Θ π (e,c))}/∂e = R’(e)
(A3) ∂ E {Θ π (e,c) - ω(Θ π (e,c))}/∂c = S’(c)
(A4) E {Θ π (e,c) - ω(Θ π (e,c))} - S(c)  ≥ 0
Let ω*(.), e*, c* be a solution to this problem. These solutions must satisfy the
incentive constraints
(A5) ∂ E {ω*(Θ π (e*,c*))}/∂e = R’(e*)
(A6) ∂ E {Θ π (e*,c*) - ω*(Θ π (e*,c*))}/∂ c = S’(c*)
The choices of e and c are independent of Θ and hence π (e,c) is independent of Θ.
Therefore, note the following
(A7) ∂ E {Θ π (e*,c*)}/∂ c = πc (e*,c*)
and re-write (A6)
(A8) πc (e*,c*)-∂ E {ω*(Θ π (e*,c*))}/∂ c = S’(c*)
Again, since e and c, and hence π (e,c), are independent of Θ, let
(A9) E {ω(Θ π (e,c))}= ψ (π (e,c))
and re-write the incentive constraints at the optimum.
(A10) ψ’(π (e*,c*))  πe(e*,c*)= R’(e*)
(A11) πc (e*,c*)- ψ ‘(π (e*,c*)) πc (e*,c*) = S’(c*)
Now consider and alternative contract.
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(A12) α + β π (e,c)
where  β = ψ ‘(π (e*,c*)).
Clearly, this contract satisfies the incentive constraints at the optimal choices. Also
since α has no impact on the incentives of either party, it is free to adjust to satisfy the
participation constraint. Finally, the standard assumptions regarding the production
function and cost of effort functions ensured a unique equilibrium (See Appendix B,
Part 1), therefore this contract produces the exact results as the general sharing rule.
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APPENDIX B. EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
SOLUTION WITH A LINEAR CONTRACT
Proposition B1: In addition to the standard properties of the production function and
cost of effort functions assumed in the text, two additional assumptions are sufficient
for the existence and uniqueness of the contracting problem. Namely, πec ≤ πcc  , πee
 and the Nash solutions for unobservable inputs are continuous functions of the
ownership share: c*(β) and e*(β) are continuous in β.
Proof: The proof proceeds in two stages. The first stage derives the Nash solutions for
unobservable inputs taking ownership share as given. The second determines the
optimal ownership share.
Stage 1.
First re-state the contracting problem. Noting that e and c are constrained only to be real
numbers and that the MNC and local firm determine their provisions of efforts
according to non-cooperative Nash behavior.
(B1) Π*M,JV = Max { e,c} α + β*π (e,c) -R(e)
      Π*L,JV = Max { e,c}  -α +[1- β]*π (e,c) -S(c
Subject to
(B2) β πe (e,c) = R’(e)
(B3) [1-β] πc (e,c) = S’(c)
(B4) [1- β] π (e,c)  - α - S(c) = 0
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Proposition B2: The properties of the restricted profit function and the assumed
properties of the cost of effort functions are sufficient for the existence of the Nash
Equilibrium.
Proof:
a.  Because π (e,c) is concave and continuous in e and c and R(e) and S(c) are each
convex and continuous, Π*M,JV  and  Π*L,JV  are concave and continuous in e and c
respectively.
b.  Because  π (e,c) is bounded from above while R(e) and S(c) are not,  there exists a
pair (eMAX, cMAX), such that the optimal choices eMAX ≥ e* and cMAX ≥ c*.
c.  Because R’(0)=S’(0)=0 and πe >0 and πc >0, e* ≥0 and c*≥0.
d.  Therefore without loss of generality, an alternative problem can be defined where e
and c are restricted to [0, eMAX] and [0, eMAX].
e.  The Nash solution to the alternative problem exists by Fudenberg and Tirole (1993)
Theorem 1.2.
Proposition B3: πec ≤ πcc  , πee are sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium.
Proof: First, note the definitions of the reaction functions for each party (e=M(c) for the
multinational and c=L(e) for the local firm).
(B5) β πe (M(c),c) = R’(M(c))
 [1-β] πc (e, L(e)) = S’(L(e))
The proof proceeds by showing that a necessary condition for multiplicity of equilibria
can never be satisfied. As can be seen from Figure B2,  which is a plot of the reaction
functions in the case πec ≥0, two necessary conditions for multiple equilibria are clearly
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(B6) M-1’(c)≥L’(c) and
        M-1’(c)≤L-1’(c).
It is straightforward to derive the slopes of the reaction functions
(B7)  M (c)
 c
 =  R
           L(c)
 c






















Three cases must be considered: πec =0, πec ≥0, and πec ≤0. When  πec =0, the reaction
functions are horizontal and vertical and the equilibrium is unique.





Now consider πec ≥0. Using the facts that Ree ≤0 and Scc ≤0 and  πec ≤ πcc  , πee ,
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Therefore the necessary condition M-1’(c)≤L-1’(c) for multiple equilibria cannot be
satisfied. The same technique can also show that the case where πec ≤0 also fails to
satisfy a necessary condition for multiple equilibria.
Stage 2
Note that the Nash equilibrium has been solved conditional on the value of β. Therefore
the solution to stage 1 gives us c*(β) and e*(β). After substituting the participation
constraint, write the MNC’s problem as
(B9) Π*M,JV = Max {Γ}  π (e*(β), c*(β)) -R(e*(β)) -S(c*(β))
Following Eswaran and Kotwal (1985), the assumption is made that c*(β) and e*(β) are
continuous in β, so a solution to this problem exists for  β ∈[ , ]0 1 .
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APPENDIX C: DETAILED SOLUTION
(C1) Π*M,JV = Max { α, β, e,c}  α +  β  [π (e,c)] -R(e) +  λ [β πe (e,c) - R’(e) ]
+ µ [ [1-β] πc (e,c) - S’(c)] + η [ [1- β] π (e,c)  - α - S(c)]
(C2) FOC α:  1 - η = 0   => The participation constraint is binding therefore and the
lump sum transfer adjusts to ensure the local firm earns no rents. Explicitly ...
(C3) [1-β] π (e,c)  - α - S(c) = 0
the remaining FOCs give us
(C4) FOC e : λ [β πee - R’’(e) ] + µ  [1-β] πce + η  [1-β] πe  + [β πe (e,c) - R’(e) ]= 0
(C5) FOC c : β πc +  λ β πec + µ [ [1-β] πcc - S’’(c)]  + η  [ [1-β] πc (e,c) - S’(c)] = 0
and
(C6) FOC β:   λ  πe - µ  πc + π(e,c)[1-η]= 0
By equation (C2), the last term equals 0, so this is simplified to
(C7) FOC β:   λ  πe - µ  πc = 0
Proposition C1: The multipliers associated with the incentive compatibility constraint
are positive.
Proof: Since πe  and πc are each strictly positive, (C7) indicates that either both or
neither of the constraints bind. Suppose that neither is binding (λ = µ = 0). (C4) and
(C5) imply πe - R’(e) = 0 and  πc  - S’(c) = 0 which cannot be satisfied for the same
value of β. Therefore both λ > 0 and µ >0.
Given that the incentive compatibility constraints bind, re-write (C4) and (C5).
(C8) FOC e : λ [β πee - R’’(e) ] + µ  [1-β] πce + η  [1- β] πe =0
(C9) FOC c : β πc +  λ β πec + µ [ [1-β] πcc - S’’(c)]  + η  [ [1-β] πc (e,c) - S’(c)] = 0
Turning attention to the optimal ownership share.
Proposition C2: Following Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995), the optimal ownership
share is a non-linear  function of the profit function and the disutility of effort functions.
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Now use (C8), (C9), and (C10) to eliminate λ and µ and find the optimal value
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π β π π β π
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− −
− + − −
e cc







Where (C11) is evaluated at the optimal e and c. In principle, (C11), and the incentive
compatibility constraints can be solved for the optimal values of β, e and c.
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APPENDIX D. POLICY ANALYSIS
All of the variables below are as defined in the text. For simplicity we let L and I be
scalars.
.1a  ,1given  that Note
.=a ,=a , =a ],-[1=a ],-[1 =a1  where(D3)
 c e I L BA  =y  (D2)



















For future reference, define
(D4) b1-a4/x, b2=a5/x x=[1-a2-a3], z=[1-b1-b2].
Following Equation (5) in the text, define the restricted profit function (for a JV).
  I p - L w- c e I L BA P MAX = c)(e,  (D5) 54321 aaaaaOutI} {L,π
Where Pout, w, and p are the unit prices of y, L and I respectively. Using standard
techniques, derive (details available)
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Using the same techniques, the following can be derived
(D8) πWOS (e,c) = DWOS eb1 cb2 and
  πTP (e,c) = DTP eb1 cb2.
It is straightforward to verify that
(D9) DWOS = γMb2 DTP and
 DTP = γLb1 DTP
Let
74
(D10) R(e) = r e and
S(c) = s c.
Now define the optimal JV contracting problem as in Equation (7).
er   c e D MAX (D11) 21 bbJVI} {L, −+α
subject to
 0 = c s  c e D ]-[1           
0= s - c e D ]-[1 b          













The first two constraints are the incentive compatibility constraints of the MNC and
local firm respectively. The last one ensures the participation of the local firm. Using
Equation (19), substituting the relevant derivatives from the functions above, and






1]-[bb[ + [1  (D13) −=β
At this point note that the optimal ownership share, β * , is determined solely by the
parameters of the production function. Because government policy will obviously have
no impact on these parameters, the effect of these policies on entry mode and
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Proposition D1: A reduction in the producer price of output paid to foreign firms, Pout,
will decrease profits and decrease the provision of all unobservable inputs.
Proof: Since e  and ci i (i=TP, JV, and WOS) are independent of Pout, the effect of a

































Proposition D2: The value of γM that indicates the border between entry via a JV and
WOS, γ M
Crit is unchanged by changes in the producer price of output, POut.
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Proof: γ M
Crit  is determined by equating a MNC’s profits under a WOS with a JV. After
substituting the participation constraint, we have the following expression which
implicitly defines γ M
Crit …
0]]c De [Dr  - c e [D-         






























Crit ) ≡ 0,
where G(γ M
Crit ) ≡ 0.
Now applying the implicit function theorem,
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In the case of binding local content requirements, the government specifies a minimum
percentage of inputs which must be purchased locally.
Following (D5) and Equation (18a), derive the restricted profit function as follows
I]- L [  + I p - L w- c e I L BA P MAX = c)(e,  (D21) 54321 aaaaaOutI} {L,
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~w =  w + pρ  . We assume the constraint binds and substitute it into the maximization
problem.
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Proposition D3: Given Cobb-Douglas technology and constant marginal cost of
unobservable inputs, binding local content requirements will decrease the profits of all
foreign owned firms, and decrease the provision of all unobservable inputs.
Proof: Recall that β* is determined solely by the parameters of the production function,
and e  and ci i are independent of φ, as can be seen from (A14) - (A16). Therefore, in
order to examine the impact of φ, all that needs to be analyzed is Di,LC. Because Di,LC is
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. L*  and I* are the optimal















≤ 0 .  Further, since e  and ci i (i=TP, JV)






















Proposition D4: The value of γM that indicates the border between entry via a JV and
WOS, γ M
Crit , is unaffected by changes in the local content requirements.
Proof: The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition A2.
Turning to the analysis of a particular Pigouvian tax, assume that the government
subsidizes foreign owned firms’ purchases of a particular imported input at a rate “t”
and collects a lump sum tax T from these firms. Further assume that all changes in taxes
are revenue neutral and begin from an initial equilibrium with t=T=0. Equation (D28) is
total JV profits. Totally differentiating this gives (D29).
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(D28) ( ) = F(L( ),  I( ) I( )  I( ) , e( ),  c( ) )  w L( ) 
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Again at the initial equilibrium, the first term and each term in the summations will






= I1 starting at t=0.
Proposition D5: Starting at the no tax equilibrium, the introduction of a small tax or












Proof: Equation (D29) and preceding discussion.
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APPENDIX E: DATA DESCRIPTION
As noted in the main body, there are two basic sources of data used in this
dissertation: the annual Industrial Survey and the annual Backcast Data. Although, the
number of questions asked has varied over time, in 1995 there were over 150 different
variables with data on over 21,000 manufacturing establishments in the Industrial
Survey (Survei Industri-SI) . This data set is intended as a census, however from 1975-
1985 new plants were generally only added as existing respondents exited the survey.
By 1985, BPS recognized that their methodology was providing them with a
distorted view of the manufacturing sector. Therefore, in conjunction with foreign
experts BPS began creating what they call the Backcast Data59. The researchers
conducted extensive door-to-door searches for all possible manufacturing
establishments in order to create a Directory of Manufacturing Establishments. This has
been continually used and updated in hopes of questioning nearly all establishments.
Surveyors knew that they had not necessarily begun questioning plants in the initial
year of production, so through a series of questionnaires and interviews, BPS
constructed estimates for all years that a particular plant had been in operation for a
subset of variables including input, output, value added, and employment. Additionally,
obvious data entry problems were corrected. BPS publishes a revised version of the
Backcast each year.  Further, there is a plant identification number so the annual SI and
Backcast can be merged.
For the purpose of this dissertation, the foreign ownership percentage
(PCT_FOR) and the export percentage (PCT_EXP) were also cleaned to eliminate
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obvious data entry problems. One persistent problem with the data is that BPS does not
employ a distinct code for missing data. Therefore a “0” can either mean a true “0” or it
can mean a particular question was left unanswered. In the case of ownership, this is
further exacerbated. If the responding plant failed to answer, BPS filled in zeroes for all
ownership categories60 and set domestic private ownership to “100.” In the interest of
correcting obvious data entry problems, two sorts of changes were made to the
ownership data. First, whenever the sum of all ownership categories did not equal 100,
the appropriate changes were made. This was generally done by inspection.
Additionally, all foreign owned firms are required to register with the Indonesian
Investment Coordinating Board (Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal - BKPM) and
BPS collects data on plant registration status. Therefore, if a period of foreign
ownership is interrupted by one or two years of reported 100% local ownership without
the appropriate change to BKPM registration status, foreign ownership is set to its pre-
and post-interruption value. Generally, these are the same. Indonesia’s regulations were
similarly used to clean the export data. Majority foreign owned plants which began
operation in Indonesia between the mid-1970’s and May of 1994 were required to meet
certain performance requirements. Chiefly, that they be export oriented. Therefore,
majority foreign owned plants which experience one or two year “interruption” in their
export status prior to 1995 are assumed to have continued to meet their statutory
obligations and an interpolated value is assumed. Again, generally the pre- and post-
values are the same.
                                                                                                                                              
59 For an extensive review of the methodology and importance of employing these data, please see
Jammal (1993).
60 BPS enumerates the foreign ownership percentage, central government ownership percentage, local
government ownership percentage and private domestic ownership percentage.
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APPENDIX F: ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY
This section derives the properties of the two-stage conditional maximum
likelihood estimator employed in the text. Following Blundell and Smith (1994), re-
write (4.1) conditionally on 2iu .
(F1)
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1i i i i iy y x u





1 1 1 2≡ ≡ − and i i iu u  which is independent of 2iu .
Let ~ *y y yi i i2 2 2 1= −α , which is independent of 1iε . Re-write (F1) as






To implement (F1), estimate (4.2) via instrumental variables which gives $ $α γ2 2 and 
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*
1
>y i , the relevant estimating equation
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Blundell and Smith (1994, 1989, 1986) show that standard Tobit ML on (F3a) provides
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subject to the standard two-limit Tobit observation rule (4.3).







* ′′=Θ σργβ , where
σ *
2  is the variance of *
1iε . Further, let ),( *N ϕΘl  be the log-likelihood function
derived from (F4) and (4.3) conditional on ix  and 2iu  for 1...N=i . Finally, let *NΘ̂ be
the ML estimator for *Θ  based on the consistent IV estimate Nϕ̂ . Blundell and Smith
(1994) show (Theorem 3.1) that *NΘ̂  is a consistent estimator for 
*Θ  and (Theorem 4.1)
asymptotically normally distributed with variance covariance matrix )ˆV( *NΘ .
The following definitions are useful in the derivation of the variance-covariance
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Note that E  is the expectations operator where all expectations are taken conditional on
ix  and 2iu . Blundell and Smith (1994, Theorem 4.1) show that
(F6) K' VCK    )ˆV( IV-1*N +Φ=Θ
where VCIV is the variance-covariance matrix of the IV estimate. Explicit expressions
for ΨΦ  and are given in Blundell and Smith (1986,1994).
First define












*0 is a matrix of zeroes and l and 0 are vectors of zeroes and ones respectively.
Following Amemiya (1979) A  is defined for the two-limit Tobit in Appendix G.
Therefore,























































=Θ′′=Θ ργβργβ . Having already obtained
the estimator $ *Θ1 , it is still necessary to derive an estimator for the structural
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parameters, $Θ1 . Given the conditions that identify Θ Θ1 1 2 11 0 from  
* , ,− >α β consider
the following set of constraints linking *11  ,  ΘΘ  and ϕ .
(F10) 0q =ΘΘ ),,( *11 ϕ ,
where the number of constraints equals the number of elements of Θ Θ1 1 and 
* . The
required estimator is uniquely defined by
(F10) 0q =ΘΘ )ˆ,ˆ,ˆ( *11 ϕ .


























































, , Blundell and Smith (1994) show that 1Θ̂  is
asymptotically distributed according to
(F12) ),0()ˆ( 11 QQV ′→Θ−Θ NN
D
For the model considered here, the constraints linking *11  ,  ΘΘ  and ϕ can be
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This Appendix derives some basic equations for the standard two limit Tobit model,































































































j  and i
jφ  are the cumulative distribution function and probability density
function of a standard normal random variable evaluated at jiz . Clearly, ix and β are
vectors of exogenous variable and parameters respectively.
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In the two limit Tobit considered in this dissertation, censoring of the dependent
variable, iy ,occurs at 0 and 1. Let )( 00 ΣΠ be the product (sum) over the zero
observations (i.e., yi = 0 ), )( ** ΣΠ  be the product (sum) over the uncensored
observation (i.e., y yi i=
* ) and )( 11 ΣΠ be the product (sum) over the observations
which are censored at 1 (i.e., yi = 1). The likelihood function and logliklihood function
can be written as
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The second derivatives are
∂
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Following Amemiya (1979) define the following symbols
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Amemiya (1979) shows that the expected value of the matrix of second derivatives can













X . *0 is a matrix of zeroes and l and 0 are vectors
of zeroes and ones respectively.
.)(a  toequalelement  diagonal-ith  with thematrices diagonal are  where
     














 APPENDIX H: EMPIRICAL MODEL
Now consider the following simplified version of the model presented in
Chapter 2. This model is very similar to that presented in Aitken, Hanson and Harrison
(1994). The important distinction is that in this dissertation, the ownership decision of
the MNC is explicitly modeled using the insights developed in this dissertation
regarding the role of bi-lateral moral hazard. Because Aitken, Hanson and Harrison
(1994) have ignored the endogeneity of this decision, their empirical estimates are
likely biased. Let total profits of a MNC’s affiliate be ...
(H1) Π( QF,QD,e,c;Q) = PF*QF + PD*QD - C(qF,e,c)Q - m(c) QD - m(e) QF
QF and QD are the quantities produced for the foreign and domestic markets with prices
PF and PD respectively. Note that the total quantity produced is assumed to be fixed.
Licensing restrictions in the Indian manufacturing sector lead Fikkert (1994) to make a
similar assumption. In Indonesia, the country considered in this dissertation there are
similar restriction placed on investors.61 Further recall that Bhattachara and LaFontaine
(1995) have show that the share parameter in bi-lateral moral hazard models, ownership
percentage in this model, is independent of scale. Indeed, the excercises in Chapter 2
demonstrated that the relative importance of the MNC and local firm contributions is
the driving force behind the determination of ownership percentage.
                                                
61 Historically, all investors have needed government approval for capacity expansions. Further, foreign
ownership has only been permitted if investments meet minimum capital requirements.
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In order to account for the benefits of MNC and local managerial contributions,
per unit production costs, C(qF,e,c), are allowed to be a decreasing function of  MNC
contributions, e, and local firm managerial contributions, c. Further, note that these
costs increase as the export percentage, qF, increases. This may be due to additional
quality measures and more demanding specifications in international markets.
Domestic, mD(c), and foreign, mF(e), marketing costs are assumed to be decreasing
functions of respective managerial efforts. Note that for simplicity, managerial inputs
are assumed to be “public” goods in that neither partner needs to make an allocation
decision. A unit of managerial resources contributed by the MNC, for example, impacts
both marketing and production costs.
Now, write the profits per-unit.
(H2) π(qF,e,c) = PF*qF + PD*[1-qF] - C(qF,e,c) - m(c) [1-qF] - m(e) qF
The MNC’s maximization problem can therefore be written as ...
(H3) Max { α, β, qF,e,c}  α +  β  [π (qF,e,c)*Q] -R(e) +  λ [β πe (qF,e,c)*Q - R’(e) ]
+ µ [ [1-β] πc (qF,e,c)*Q - S’(c)] + η [ [1- β] π (qF,e,c)*Q  - α - S(c)]
+ ϕ0 [β] + ϕ1[1-β]
This is similar to the problem examined in Chapter 2. There is one additional choice
variable, qF, and two additional constraints to explicitly account for the fact that the
ownership share must lie between 0 and 1. Much of the formal analysis of this problem
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is the same as earlier and will not be repeated. For example, the lump sum portion of the
contract will be adjusted to reduced the local partner to the reservation level of profits
and the incentive constraints can be solved simultaneously to give e and c as functions
of the ownership percentage. The two interesting variables for empirical research are
the ownership percentage and the export percentage. The first order conditions for these
choice variables are62 ...
(H4) FOC qF: πqF(qF,e,c)+ λ [β πe (qF,e,c)*Q]+ µ [ [1-β] πc (qF,e,c)*Q = 0
PF- PD - CqF(qF,e,c) + λ βm ee
F ( ) - µ [1-β] m cc
D ( ) =0
(H5) FOC β:   λ  πe - µ  πc + ϕ0  - ϕ1 =0
λ  [-Ce(qF,e,c)- m ee
F ( )  qF] - µ [-Ce(qF,e,c) - m cc
D ( ) [1- qF]] + ϕ0  - ϕ1 =0
Assume that the solution to this problem can be represented according to the empirical
model in the main text. Notice that this problem indicates that the optimal value of β
(qF) depends on the chosen value of qF (β). The incentive constraints ensure that this is
the case. This means that the system of equations to be estimated is endogenous in the
observed rather than latent values.
                                                
62 For simplicity, it is assumed that Ce,qF(qF,e,c)= Cc,qF(qF,e,c)=0.
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